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STRICTLY LEAKAGE: HOW MINNESOTA EXPORT 
SUBSIDIES PAY FOR CLIMATE POLLUTION 
Hudson B. Kingston
* 
“We are quite in the electric way. We boast that we 
have made electricity our slave, but the slave whom we 
do not understand is our master. And before we know 
him we shall be transformed.”  
—Charles Dudley Warner “The Electric Way”1 
 
“We will all burn together when we burn.” 
—Tom Lehrer “We Will All Go Together When We 
Go”2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 13, 2015, Minnesota DFL Governor Mark Dayton signed an 
omnibus energy bill sent to him by the Republican-controlled state 
legislature.
3
 Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the President of 
the United States three days later.
4
 At the time, many energy policy experts—
at least in Minnesota—would have predicted the former would have more 
lasting effects on state policy and the global climate. Many things have 
changed since 2015.  
Nevertheless, one small part of the omnibus energy bill that came into 
effect that summer is having a largely unnoticed but lasting impact on 
Minnesota and the world. Buried within the legislation is a policy that is 
making its mark on Minnesota’s water and the world’s climate—Minnesota 
Statute § 216B.1696, the “Competitive Rate for Energy-Intensive, Trade-
Exposed Electric Utility Customer”5 subsection. This legacy of 
policymakers’ efforts to support resource extraction and export industries 
imposes high costs on Minnesotans.  
Who is an Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) Utility Customer? 
What is an EITE rate, and what does it matter if Minnesota hands it out to 
 
3 H.F. 3, 89th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2015).  
4 Donald Trump, Presidential Campaign Announcement in New York City (June 16, 2015), 
in Transcript: Donald Trump Announces his Presidential Candidacy, CBS News (June 16, 
2015, 3:31 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-donald-trump-announces-his-
presidential-candidacy/ [https://perma.cc/R57T-FWWK]. 
5 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1696 (2018).  
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the largest consumers of energy in the state? This article seeks to introduce 
these concepts without getting too deep into the economic theory or political 
horse-trading behind the law’s enactment. 
At its root, an EITE rate is a subsidy that is only granted to “Trade-
Exposed” large users of energy.6 In Minnesota, it seeks to increase 
production and resource extraction by statutorily-defined “Energy-
Intensive” industries that receive consistent support from politicians across 
the political spectrum.7 These companies see a profitable upside to 
acquiring their electricity at deeply discounted rates.8 
The resultant downside to an EITE subsidy can be remarkably broad, 
however, touching Minnesotans’ livelihoods and shared resources alike. 
While the money generated by the subsidized industries is mostly funneled 
out of the state,9 the externalities created by these industries—often in the 
form of water pollution—remain on Minnesota’s ledger. Additionally, the 
 
6 Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT 
ECON., https://aceee.org/topics/energy-intensive-trade-exposed-industries 
[https://perma.cc/96K3-MT6B]. 
7 Elizabeth Dunbar, Nolan, Franken, Klobuchar Weigh in on PolyMet Mine, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), https://blogs.mprnews.org/capitol-view/2014/03/nolan-
franken-klobuchar-weigh-in-on-polymet-mine/ [https://perma.cc/NP4Z-TEG5]; Leah Ryan, 
It Is a History Worth Telling, MESABI DAILY NEWS (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.virginiamn.com/mine/it-is-a-history-worth-telling/article_248ce90e-7976-11e8-
9f61-eb53bd32cac9.html [https://perma.cc/GR67-6QNP] (quoting DFL lawmakers); Kurt 
Daudt, Letter to the Editor, DFL Anti-Mining; Not so GOP, MESABI DAILY NEWS (Aug. 
16, 2016), https://www.virginiamn.com/opinion/letters_to_editor/dfl-anti-mining-not-so-
gop/article_f718e8ae-61b4-11e6-a389-6fa6912f9c21.html [https://perma.cc/65UF-5BNR] 
(“Republicans . . . have and will continue to support the responsible mining of our natural 
resources, and will work in St. Paul and in Washington to promote the future of mining in 
our state[.]”). 
8 U.S. STEEL CORP., FIRST QUARTER 2017: EARNINGS PRESENTATION 14 (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.ussteel.com/sites/default/files/reports_filings/USS%20Earnings%20Call%20Slid
es [https://perma.cc/2EMA-NNYM] (noting that maintaining profitability depends on 
keeping energy prices low). 
9 As discussed later, Minnesota’s iron mining industry produces largely lower-value inputs 
for steelmaking conducted in other states, ultimately profiting companies headquartered 
outside of Minnesota—some in foreign countries. See About Us, CLEVELAND-CLIFFS INC., 
http://www.clevelandcliffs.com/English/about-us/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GU56-
XWTR]; Press Release, Verso Corp., Verso Corporation Reports Second Quarter 2019 
Financial Results (Aug. 8, 2019), http://investor.versoco.com/2019-08-08-Verso-
Corporation-Reports-Second-Quarter-2019-Financial-Results [https://perma.cc/26LG-
GCB5]; Sustainability, ARCELORMITTAL S.A., 
https://corporate.arcelormittal.com/sustainability/reporting-hub/country-
reports/luxembourg [https://perma.cc/4EJ4-LBSX]. The two proposed copper/nickel 
sulfide mines in northern Minnesota are principally owned by Swiss and Chilean companies. 
See GLENCORE PLC, MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT 2018, at 24 (2018), 
https://www.glencore.com/dam:jcr/06fa4bf0-e9b7-4a11-b372-f60f6b633388/2018-modern-
slavery-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4N3-ND5H ] (listing Swiss address); About Us, 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC, https://www.antofagasta.co.uk/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/Z47T-
L7QT]; see also infra note 10. 
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ostensible purpose of an EITE subsidy is to offset and adjust for 
comprehensive climate change policies, which Minnesota does not have. As 
a result of this counterweight to controls that do not exist, the EITE subsidy 
funds pollution impacting Minnesotans and the world, while profits are 
realized primarily by out-of-state interests.10  
This article attempts to describe both climate change pollution impacts 
that are local to Minnesota, and the longer-term global social cost of carbon. 
In the world of climate change economic theory, the word “leakage” is a 
term of art. Normally: “carbon leakage occurs when a developed country 
threatens or puts restrictions on carbon emissions (cap-and-trade, for 
example) into effect, and subsequently emission-dependent industries 
relocate to countries with no emissions restrictions.”11 Relocation to a 
country with weaker standards on climate pollution is “leakage,” because 
the pollution leaks out of regulatory controls despite a strong standard in 
the original jurisdiction. Leakage could ultimately lead to larger total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over time.12 Turning the normal concept 
on its head, Minnesota’s failure to restrict carbon emissions, paired with its 
subsidy on the most energy-intensive industries, attracts leakage to the state—
pulling production from other countries that might have better regulatory 
control on the same industries.  
The discussion that follows attempts to cover global issues and 
international law while also touching on Minnesota law and specific facilities. 
This article first discusses the theory behind EITE rates before addressing 
how the issue has been handled in Minnesota. It then turns to the EITE 
subsidy’s impacts on Minnesota’s economy and the local and global 
environment. Finally, it addresses how export subsidies on goods are usually 
treated under international trade law applicable to the United States. 
II. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EITE OUTSIDE OF MINNESOTA 
There was an ongoing discussion about the best way to reduce GHG 
emissions among heavy industries before the term of art “Energy-Intensive, 
Trade-Exposed” was coined. Termed “sectoral approaches” in 2007, the 
International Energy Administration (IEA) analyzed the sectoral 
approaches available to heavy industry with significant GHG emissions in a 
 
10 In some cases, such as ArcelorMittal USA and Enbridge Energy, EITE subsidies ultimately 
benefit foreign owned corporations and profits flow overseas. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. 
DEPT. COMMERCE, STEEL IMPORTS REPORT: UNITED STATES 6 (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/imports-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/S23M-YGP7]; 
About Us, ENBRIDGE INC., https://www.enbridge.com/About-Us/Our-Company.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HJ6B-X4VU] (“Enbridge Inc. is headquartered in Calgary, Alberta.”).  
11 Stephen Sewalk, A Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Is WTO Compatible, 25 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 338, 341 (2014). 
12 AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 6. 
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seminal report.13 That IEA paper was first to describe “trade-exposed and 
emissions-intensive” industries and is cited by scholarly literature on the 
EITE policies that followed.14 The subject of this report15 has been 
embraced by economists and climate policy experts alike.16 Many 
jurisdictions that have taken action on climate change have also passed 
EITE controls consistent with these economic theories. 
A. The IEA Framework for Sectoral Approaches 
In the report, IEA attempted to establish the best way to quickly reduce 
GHG emissions among EITE industries. While not an environmental 
organization, IEA recognized the importance of crafting economic models 
that would minimize harmful pollution and prevent a race to the bottom:  
As economies grow, so does their appetite for various energy 
services. This translates into liquid fuels for transport, and 
electricity for various end-uses, including in industry. The 
increasing cost of conventional resources would lead to the 
reliance on non-conventional resources and the transformation 
of coal, abundantly available, into liquid and gaseous products—
with much higher level of CO2 emissions than conventional fuels 
emit.17 
Describing the challenge as “significant,” and admitting that the 
“current energy path is simply not sustainable,” the IEA explained that this 
problem requires new breakthrough technologies, higher efficiency in 
energy use across the board, and a large shift to low-carbon or zero-carbon 
 
13 As discussed below, infra note 347, the sectors identified by the IEA create significant 
emissions, but in Minnesota, reliance on coal and other fossil fuels for electricity production 
renders them even more greenhouse-gas intensive in the aggregate. Regardless, even if 
industry fully adopted modern technology and only used clean electricity, their activities 
would still result in emissions. The sectoral approach seeks to update sector technology and 
address direct emissions from industry processes as much as possible. See RICHARD BARON 
ET AL., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, SECTORAL APPROACHES TO GREENHOUSE GAS 
MITIGATION 8 (2007), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Sectoral_Approach_Info_W
EB.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6UF-X6PZ].  
14 Search Results for ‘Sectoral approaches to greenhouse gas mitigation,’ GOOGLE SCHOLAR, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=6717972325260854185&as_sdt=5,24&sciodt=0,24
&hl=en [https://perma.cc/2HD8-AW56]. 
15 It is not the author’s intent to suggest IEA was the first to address this topic, only that the 
report has been cited by many scholars discussing EITE rates since its publication.  
16 See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 6. 
17 See BARON ET AL., supra note 13, at 14. 
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energy sources.18 Well-designed EITE rates could help achieve many of 
these ends.19 
This IEA Report was written in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change20 and was especially 
interested in how to engage heavy-emitting industries across the two 
categories of countries: (1) developed countries that made “binding” GHG 
reduction commitments21 and (2) developing countries that were 
encouraged to reduce emissions without similar binding commitments.22 As 
such, the IEA explored how heavy-emitting industries operating across both 
categories of countries might work together—cooperating to reduce overall 
emissions while making sure that strong climate change policies did not give 
facilities in developing countries (where there are generally weaker 
environmental protections) a competitive advantage that could distort global 
markets.23 
 
18 See id. at 14. 
19 IEA found promise in information sharing between developing countries across the 
Asia/Pacific region but admitted that success would depend “on a range of factors” and that 
it was not certain to succeed. See id. at 9. In the EU, the steel industry proposed an efficient-
production-incentivization system, which would “reward higher than average performance 
and penalize installations below, based on a global assessment.” See id. at 9. European firms 
are also “[t]urning to technology development, iron and steel seems the most advanced in 
efforts to develop low-CO2 steelmaking processes, with coordination ensured by the 
[International Iron and Steel Institute].” See id. at 9. This coordination initiative seems to 
have been active until at least 2010. WORLD RES. INST. & WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), GREENHOUSE GAS 
PROTOCOL, https://ghgprotocol.org/Third-Party-Databases/IISI [https://perma.cc/N4QT-
NHSU]. The organization asserts it is still active in climate change initiatives and is an 
accredited observer at the UNFCCC. Who We Are, WORLD STEEL ASS’N, 
https://www.worldsteel.org/about-us/who-we-are.html [https://perma.cc/3LSS-75GB].  
20 For some background on this treaty and the regime it sought to establish, see the UN’s 
primer. What is the Kyoto Protocol?, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-
protocol/what-is-the-kyoto-protocol [https://perma.cc/M6ZY-G5WY]. 
21 Binding commitments still relied on the good intentions of developed countries. Canada, 
for example, left the Kyoto Protocol when it was apparent it would not meet its commitment. 
Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol, CBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-pulls-out-of-kyoto-protocol-1.999072 
[https://perma.cc/FD3G-LB88]. Without accountability mechanisms, like those built into 
WTO trade agreements, treaty obligations rely on political pressure, face-saving, and national 
pride as means of enforcement. 
22 “Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high 
levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial 
activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’” See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 20. 
23 Because the U.S. did not join the Kyoto Protocol, it has not committed to control its GHG 
emissions along with other developed nations. The U.S. is, however, a member of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the more general umbrella treaty.  
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According to IEA’s analysis, the overall objective is to set an EITE 
policy that “would aim at reducing emissions from large industrial sectors 
while alleviating the concerns about unfair competition from unregulated 
areas and possible associated carbon leakage.”24 The IEA analysis discusses 
several global industries which have major impacts on the environment due 
to their high GHG emissions. Relevant to the discussion in this piece, the 
analysis briefly mentions the paper industry but does a deep dive into the 
global iron and steel industry.
25
  
Why these industries? According to the UN, resource extraction 
accounts for half of global GHG emissions.26 “Extraction and primary 
processing of metals and other minerals is responsible for 20% of health 
impacts from air pollution and 26% of global carbon emissions.”27 As 
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), iron and 
steel production is a massive source of direct GHG emissions28 and is often 
integral to many other manufacturing industries.29 Within the metals sector, 
 
24 See BARON ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.  
25 See id. at 17.  
26 Press Release, UN Env’t Programme, UN Calls for Urgent Rethink as Resource use 
Skyrockets (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-
release/un-calls-urgent-rethink-resource-use-skyrockets [https://perma.cc/QRE2-8RVD]; 
Elsa Tsioumani, Global Outlook Highlights Resource Extraction as Main Cause of Climate 
Change, Biodiversity Loss, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 19, 2019), 
http://sdg.iisd.org/news/global-outlook-highlights-resource-extraction-as-main-cause-of-
climate-change-biodiversity-loss/ [https://perma.cc/AUQ8-ML9W] (referencing the Global 
Resources Outlook 2019 report on the status and trends of natural resource use and 
management, which was released during the fourth session of the UN Environment 
Assembly). 
27 Jonathan Watts, Resource Extraction Responsible for Half World’s Carbon Emissions, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/12/resource-extraction-carbon-
emissions-biodiversity-loss [https://perma.cc/4M5F-9WM2]; see also id. (“The biggest 
surprise to the authors was the huge climate impact of pulling materials out of the ground 
and preparing them for use. All the sectors combined together accounted for 53% of the 
world’s carbon emissions - even before accounting for any fuel that is burned.”). 
28 See Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/ghgrp-metals [https://perma.cc/GQU7-3WVJ] 
[hereinafter GHGRP] (“[F]erroalloy, iron and steel . . . production facilities report GHG 
emissions from metal smelting, refining, and/or casting activities, as well as from stationary 
fuel combustion sources.”); MICHAEL TURNER, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE GLOBAL 
NETWORK FOR CLIMATE SOLUTION, MITIGATING IRON AND STEEL EMISSIONS 1 (Nico 
Tyabji ed., 2012), http://climate.columbia.edu/files/2012/04/GNCS-Iron-Steel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W3GF-T2YC] (stating emissions come from indirect electricity emissions 
as well as onsite combustion and the use of coal and lime as feedstock). 
29 Homegrown iron and steel production is seen by many countries as necessary to hedge 
against times of scarcity or war. C.R., Why the World Has Too Much Steel, THE 
ECONOMIST (May 5, 2016), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2016/05/05/why-the-world-has-too-much-steel [https://perma.cc/3QM3-RH7F]. As 
the IEA put it, across the EITE industries and the GHG policies that address them, “so-
called national circumstances loom large[.]” See BARON ET AL., supra note 13. 
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EPA data shows iron and steel production are by far the largest direct 
emitters of GHGs with 82% of the share and 72,609,302 metric tons of 
CO2e30 emissions: 
 
 
 
31 
A large portion of these iron and steel industry emissions, at least in 
the facilities that exist in Minnesota, comes from blast furnaces, which are 
responsible for fully 70% of all direct CO2 emissions.32 An overview of 
global industry emissions estimates that “[a]lthough emissions vary by 
country and region depending on the reducing materials used, other energy 
inputs, the source of electricity inputs and plant efficiency, 75% of all CO2 
emissions from the steel industry come from coke and coal in iron making 
 
30 “CO2e” is a common denominator of GHG emissions where the attributable impacts of 
other gasses are calculated to their equivalent in terms of tons of carbon dioxide. This allows 
policymakers and scientists to compare emissions of carbon dioxide against other GHG 
emissions that are more, or less, harmful on a per-ton basis than carbon dioxide.  
31  See GHGRP, supra note 28. 
32 J. DE BEER ET AL., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM MAJOR 
INDUSTRIAL SOURCES III – IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION, at ii (2000), 
https://www.ieaghg.org/docs/General_Docs/Reports/PH3-30%20iron-steel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z459-PW3J]. “Smaller but still significant CO2 emissions come from 
rolling and finishing of products (12%), ore preparation (12%) and oxygen and power 
production (7%). By contrast in scrap based mini-mills the main emissions are from the 
electric arc furnace (45%), finishing and rolling (36%) and oxygen/power production (16%).” 
Id.  
8
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for the [basic oxygen furnace] process.”33 As will be seen below, this is the 
method of choice in Minnesota iron plants.34 
Notably, the IEA analysis of carbon leakage covers producing iron and 
steel products but not the mining of iron ore.35 This makes sense because 
the likelihood that iron mining will move from an iron-rich ore body to an 
area without iron in the ground is exactly zero.36 If the odds of leakage for 
emissions from mining are low, they should not need EITE policy 
protections.  
The IEA identified and discussed four broad policy categories for 
“sectoral approaches” to guard against EITE leakage: 
1. Country-specific quantitative approach: A country’s initiative 
limited to a sector, recognized by the international community 
(e.g., UNFCCC Parties) . . .  
2.  Sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs): 
A country would pledge a policy that delivers both sustainable 
development objectives and, incidentally, lower greenhouse gas 
emissions. This pledge would be made to the international 
community (e.g., the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties).  
3. Transnational quantitative sectoral approach: The most 
challenging of all options, these would aim at engaging a sector on 
a broad international basis.  
4. Technology-oriented approaches: These range from pooled or 
coordinated R&D on innovative, low-GHG technologies, to 
activities towards the diffusion of existing technologies.37 
The report also discussed real-world experience in places where 
carbon emissions were controlled, using some of these techniques. As a 
result of the European Union (EU) leadership's stance on pricing carbon 
emissions, the IEA found that the EU’s iron and steel industries’ attempt to 
lower GHG emissions already used carbon pricing concepts to encourage 
greater efficiency by producers.38 The IEA analysis speaks positively of 
 
33 See TURNER, supra note 28. 
34 See infra Section VI.B. 
35 See BARON ET AL., supra note 13, at 56. See also AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT 
ECON., supra note 6. (listing relevant industries including “glass, steel, metal casting, pulp and 
paper, aluminum, and chemicals” but not mining). 
36 While relative costs do affect business interests and could impact the pace of extraction at 
a certain location, the relative scarcity of ore and location-specific nature of mining mitigates 
the threat that industry will pack up and forever leave town due to incremental cost increases. 
Interest in northern Minnesotan copper and precious metals mining has been an on-again 
off-again proposition amongst wildcat mining companies for over forty years, and while no 
mines have opened to date, new prospectors are consistently looking to extract those 
resources.  
37 See BARON ET AL., supra note 13, at 7. As will be seen below, Minnesota’s EITE statute 
doesn’t adopt any of these approaches.  
38 See id. at 9. 
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setting sectoral best-practices benchmarks and then crediting sectors that 
outperform the baseline.39 However, implementation and the details of how 
this is done are not trivial problems.40 Baselines could be affected by any 
number of factors specific to the countries where the industry exists.41 
Particularly relevant to this discussion and Minnesota’s EITE rate, the 
IEA explained that: “Energy efficiency performance in competitive 
industries results naturally from prevailing energy prices. Incentives may be 
needed to achieve similar performance elsewhere.”42 It makes sense that a 
competitive industry participant’s interest in becoming more efficient (i.e., 
saving on energy costs) is heightened by high energy prices, while the same 
interest can be depressed by low prices. In places with artificially low (and, 
in Minnesota, overtly subsidized) energy prices that shelter participants from 
competition, there is little inducement for polluters to adopt better, more 
efficient technology.  
To summarize some of IEA’s main findings, after a carbon tax or cap-
and-trade system is in effect, an EITE policy should: (1) force technological 
innovation and the adoption of new technologies for GHG reductions in 
key industries; (2) protect producers from being undercut by competitors 
who are not subject to strong GHG reduction standards; and (3) keep costs 
of technological improvement as low as possible and allow for fair 
integration into larger GHG reduction systems. As will be discussed further 
below, Minnesota’s EITE statute and subsequent regulator-approved 
subsidy of pollution fails on the first metric. Thus far it has entrenched the 
status quo and induced pollution output without any inducement to adopt 
new efficient technologies among most-emission-intensive industries. 
B. Examples of Anti-Leakage EITE Measures 
“Lawmakers around the world, including in China, the European 
Union, and California, have enacted carbon pricing programs.”43 Carbon 
fees of some sort exist in seventy regions or countries, and potentially cover 
20% of worldwide emissions.44 While not all measures have been fully 
 
39 These benchmarks measure how many inputs result in a certain volume of outputs, thus 
measuring efficiency on a per-unit basis rather than only looking at energy savings. See id. at 
9. 
40 See id. at 9. 
41 See id. at 10 (noting that energy prices, regulatory barriers, and other specific facility 
conditions can impact baseline data). 
42 See id. at 10. 
43 Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-
report-2040.html [https://perma.cc/4UWY-KH2H]. 
44 John Vidal, Concrete Is Tipping Us into Climate Catastrophe. It’s Payback Time, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/feb/25/concrete-is-
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successful, and some policies in the U.S., Australia, and Canada were 
changed or repealed before they could be fully implemented, many 
attempts at GHG-controlling regimes have included EITE measures. These 
were designed to balance the reduction of GHG emissions with the intent 
to minimize leakage and damage to key industries. 
1. U.S. Clean Power Plan 
In the U.S., a comprehensive nationwide EITE-like standard was 
proposed for one sector in the Obama years. The Clean Power Plan, a 
regulation adopted under the federal government’s Clean Air Act 
authorities, had many elements of the credit-based trading system (either 
based on an overall cap on tons of GHG emission or rate-based credits,45 
depending on which system states opted for) which the IEA paper described 
as a good sectoral approach.
46
 While the U.S. Congress has not passed 
comprehensive climate change legislation, the House of Representatives 
passed a scheme in 2009 that included EITE provisions which would have 
protected U.S. industries from unfair competition in countries that did not 
control carbon pollution.47 However, this bill failed to pass the Senate, 
never becoming law.  
 
tipping-us-into-climate-catastrophe-its-payback-time-cement-tax [https://perma.cc/G88J-
5TJ2] (“The consensus is that the carbon in all these schemes is still priced way too low to 
drive change and to encourage fuel-intensive industries like cement to change practices. At 
best, the carbon schemes have encouraged cement makers and other big emitters to relocate 
to avoid charges.”). 
45 In this case, the term “rate-based” means the rate at which pounds of GHGs are emitted 
per unit of energy produced. See generally Clayton Munnings, Emission Rate vs. Mass Goals 
in EPA’s Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES (Sept. 5, 2014), 
https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/emission-rate-vs-mass-goals-in-epa039s-
clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/M9G4-GZYC]. 
46 See BARON ET AL., supra note 13, at 24. While the electrical sector is less prone to carbon 
leakage than the iron and steel industries (steel can be shipped to the other side of the planet 
while electrical grids rarely traverse more than a few thousand miles), EPA organized the 
Clean Power Plan in a manner suggested by the IEA—so all states’ energy producers would 
have been subject to the same rigorous standards but were able to research and adopt new 
technologies on the way to compliance. The Trump Administration subsequently 
announced plans to review and upend the Clean Power Plan and similar Obama-era GHG 
reduction rules. See Review of the Clean Power Plan, 40 C.F.R. 60 (2017). As of publication, 
the final repeal of the Clean Power Plan has been published and environmental groups, as 
well as several states, had committed to suing the federal government to block the new rule 
and Clean-Power-Plan repeal. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, 84 F.R. 32520 (2019); 
e.g., Press Release, Nat. Res. Def. Council, Others Sue to Overturn Trump’s Do-nothing 
Climate Plan, (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/media/2019/190814-0 
[https://perma.cc/2NY7-VY99]. 
47 See Joshua Schneck et al., Primer, Protecting Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed Industry, 
NICHOLAS INST. ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS 2 (Oct. 2009), 
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/understanding-hr2454-
protecting-energy-intensive-trade-exposed-industry-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W75-
GYXF] (discussing how such an EITE rate would work in the House’s bill).  
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2. EU Carbon Market  
The EU created and implemented a carbon cap and trade system that 
requires all member states of the EU to enforce carbon controls on polluters 
in their jurisdictions. Member states punish emitters for exceeding their 
allotted or purchased carbon credit allowances, including per-ton fines for 
excessive emissions.48 “The push for carbon efficiency is clear: After 
measuring emissions and distributing initially-free allowances, the E.U. cap 
and trade system transitions into auctioning allowances, with criteria-based 
exceptions playing a mitigating role.”49 
In addition to the initially-free allowances to major emitters, EU 
member states were also explicitly allowed to prevent carbon leakage by 
adopting “financial measures” that account for certain industries’ large 
energy usage and seek to mitigate energy costs in order to avoid forcing these 
industries to relocate.50  
3. Australia’s Carbon Tax and Credit System 
While it has since been repealed, Australia in 2011 passed a different 
type of carbon restriction that serves as another example of how an EITE 
exception might fit within a strong system of pollution restrictions. The law’s 
first stage imposed a carbon tax at a set per-ton rate for all large emitters.51 
Recognizing the danger of carbon leakage, Australia also set up a system to 
support major emitters subject to carbon regulation.52 “Sectors [included] 
range from aluminum, steel, paper, glass, and cement manufacturers to oil 
refineries[.]” Eighty percent of emissions from manufacturing were subject 
to the program.53  
 
48 Juscelino Colares, The Dynamics and Global Implications of Subglobal Carbon-
Restricting Regimes, 25 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 421 (2013). 
49 Id. at 423. 
50 Id. Entities in industries at “significant risk” of carbon leakage, due to overseas competition 
from non-carbon-restricted rivals, can obtain free carbon credits, but only if they are the 
most-efficient producers in their industry. “Companies in these at-risk sectors may receive 
up to 100% free allowances based on benchmarks set by the average performance of the 10% 
most efficient installations from 2007-2008 in the same sector.” Id. at 422–23 (internal 
quotations omitted). With state-specific financial measures plus EU-given free allowances, 
this structure allowed for two different levels of local-industry protections, and state policies 
could potentially undercut the incentive for efficiency if pushed too far. 
51 Id. at 427–28. The law was set to transition to an EU-style cap-and-trade system within 
three years. Id. at 428. However, it was repealed before that fully came into effect. Id. at 430 
(discussing how the opposition had pledged to repeal the law in 2013). 
52 Id. at 429 (discussing the Jobs and Competitiveness Program).  
53 Id.  
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4. Subnational EITE Programs in North America 
Closer to home, some U.S. states and Canadian provinces have 
discussed or attempted EITE exceptions within strong carbon regulation 
regimes. 
 i. West Coast: Carbon Markets and Efficiency 
Under California’s 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act, the state 
regulator was charged with minimizing GHG emissions across the economy, 
and adopting regulations to minimize leakage.54 Under this authority, the 
California Air Resources Board promulgated a “leakage risk analysis 
methodology” in 2010 that ranks industries based on their energy 
intensiveness and trade exposure, then assigns them credits in the carbon 
market if they are especially prone to leakage.55 Through its “Industrial 
Assistance” allocation of credits in the carbon market, the state holds 
industries to mandatory reporting regulations and allocates some credits to 
the industries through a combined analysis of their products and energy 
output under the leakage methodology.56 The state also allocates some 
credits to utilities to protect ratepayers from spikes in their bills due to 
carbon market regulation.57 California’s carbon cap and trade system was 
updated and extended in 2017, prolonging the GHG limits and carbon 
market until at least 2030. In doing so, the Legislature locked in carbon 
market credits for some of the state’s biggest polluters (including the oil 
industry) that could also be characterized as EITE standards.58 The 
Legislature’s action slowed the phase-out of the carbon credit allowances 
and kept the allowance allocation at 100% until 2021 rather than lowering 
 
54 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
38505(j) (2006) (defining “leakage” as a “reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases within 
the state that is offset by an increase in emissions of greenhouse gases outside the state”). 
55 17 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 96012-96014 (2006) app. B.  
56 Allowance Allocation, CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, 
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/allowanceallocation/allowanceallocation.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XZ8U-F4VB]. For the relevant rules in California law: “Sections 
95852.2(e), 95870(e), 95890, 95891, and 95894 of the Cap-and-Trade Regulation describe 
allowance allocation for industrial assistance.” Id.  
57 See id. 
58 Georgina Gustin, California’s New Cap-and-Trade Plan Heads for a Vote—with Tradeoffs, 
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jul. 15, 2017), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/12072017/california-cap-trade-climate-legislation-AB32-
carbon-trading-rewrite [https://perma.cc/8VAZ-THN8].  
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it.59  Both Washington60 and Oregon61 have attempted to pass similar 
carbon pollution limits with anti-leakage EITE standards included,62 but 
both proposed legislation (Oregon)63 and agency action (Washington)64  
were scrapped under industry and political opposition.  
 
59 See A.B. 398, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (“This bill would, until January 1, 
2031, require the state board to include specified price ceilings, price containment points, 
offset credit compliance limits, and industry assistance factors for allowance allocation as part 
of a regulation that establishes a system of market-based declining annual aggregate emissions 
limits for sources or categories of sources that emit greenhouse gases from January 1, 2021, 
to December 31, 2030, inclusive.”).  
60 In implementing its Clean Air Rule, the Washington state Department of Ecology 
proposed an EITE program of its own, requiring below-average industry participants to 
increase production efficiency by 2.7 percent annually and requiring lesser efficiency 
improvements for already efficient manufacturers. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Efficiency 
Baselines and Limits for Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Businesses, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 
2016), https://youtu.be/nGme_F0ebtg [https://perma.cc/2EPQ-RL2Y]. In this case, 
“production efficiency” is the number of pounds per tons of GHG emitted per unit of 
production. Under the rule, major emitters in the EITE category would have had to comply 
with standards by 2020 but would have also benefitted from designation. WASH. DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, CLEAN AIR RULE: POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE PARTIES, at iii (June 2016), 
https://ecology.wa.gov/DOE/files/03/03f1c305-7f1c-4a66-bf1b-2285d63a5388.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5DRK-TH2H].  
61 Oregon considered carbon-reducing legislation incorporating an exception for EITE 
businesses. The proposed bill would set a cap on GHG pollution and would give EITE 
entities 90 percent of the credits they would need for their business. Kristin Eberhard, 
Oregon’s Clean Energy Jobs Bill Is Poised for a Breakthrough, SIGHTLINE INST., (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://www.sightline.org/2018/01/22/oregons-clean-energy-jobs-bill-is-poised-for-a-
breakthrough/ [https://perma.cc/2RM9-ZE2Z]. 
62 See, e.g., Samantha Larson, Washington State Implements Rule to Combat Climate 
Change, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/washington-
climate-change-plan-rules [https://perma.cc/EF4F-5YMH] (“The Clean Air Rule, which goes 
into effect Oct. 17, will initially apply to 24 businesses that each produce at least 100,000 
metric tons of carbon each year, including all five oil refineries in Washington, as well as 
power plants, fuel distributors and other industries.”).  
63 Dirk Vanderhart, After Republican Protest, Oregon’s Climate Plan Dies, NAT’L. PUB. 
RADIO (Jun. 25, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/25/735792788/after-republican-
protest-oregons-climate-plan-dies [https://perma.cc/BM2B-24M6].  
64 Jim Brunner, Judge: Washington State Can’t Enforce Inslee Order to Cut Greenhouse-
gas Emissions, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/politics/judge-state-cant-enforce-inslee-order-to-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6US-4DAK]; see also Press Release, Ass’n of Wash. Bus., Judge 
Declares Clean Air Rule Invalid (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.awb.org/press-
releases/?id=1656 [https://perma.cc/2UGV-G4E6] (supporting the invalidation of the rule); 
News Release, Wash. Dept’ of Ecology, Clean Air Rule (2018), https://ecology.wa.gov/Air-
Climate/Climate-change/Clean-Air-Rule [https://perma.cc/V3BE-F7XM] (resulting in the 
suspension of the clean air rule). But see News Release, Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, Ecology 
Statement on Appeal Filed with Washington State Supreme Court (May 14, 2018) 
https://ecology.wa.gov/About-us/Get-to-know-us/News/2018/May-Ecology-appeals-
Washington-State-Supreme-Court [https://perma.cc/2J8J-CS45] (announcing the 
government’s intent to appeal court ruling).  
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 ii. Canadian: Carbon Markets and Tax 
Canada’s economy depends heavily on resource extraction. At the 
same time, the country presents itself as a leader on addressing GHG 
emissions. This contradiction creates tension between its economy and 
image. In 2016, Alberta’s government announced its intention to protect 
EITE industries, specifically the oil and gas extraction industries, in 
conjunction with its provincial price on carbon.65 “The Alberta Climate 
Leadership Panel advised . . . that ‘sector-specific, output-based allocations 
of emissions rights should be used to mitigate competitiveness and 
employment impacts in trade-exposed sectors and to protect electricity 
consumers from significant and unnecessary rate increases as coal-fired 
power is phased out in the province.”66 Consistent with Alberta’s 2016 
commitment, it established a crediting system for its largest emitters and 
updated the program further in 2018 to account for additional 
considerations and complexities.67 The first North American jurisdiction to 
impose a carbon tax was British Columbia (BC).68 At the time, BC gave 
short-term relief to its cement industry to offset impacts as the industry 
modernized.69 Additionally, some Canadian jurisdictions with relatively low 
populations and fewer resources have come close to implementing 
comprehensive carbon restrictions (that likely would have included EITE 
 
65 Mark Lowey, Alberta will Protect Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries in 
Implementing Climate Plan: Environment Minister, ENVIROLINE (Jul. 21, 2016), 
http://envirolinenews.ca/news-analysis/news/2016/07/21/alberta-will-protect-
energyintensive-tradeexposed-industries-in-implementing-climate-plan-environment-
minister/ [https://perma.cc/4NCJ-647M]. The province’s economy is heavily reliant on 
EITE industries, accounting for 18 percent of the province’s economic activity at the time. 
Id. 
66 Id. The government agreed and decided to apply the carbon price to tar sands and mining 
operations, while giving the largest emitters “emissions rights” based on “output or value 
added.” Id. The allocations went to the most efficient performers and decrease by one to 
two percent annually, while less efficient producers must pay the provincial carbon price’s 
going rate. Id. 
67 Thomas McInerney & Duncan McPherson, Alberta Replaces Specified Gas Emitters 
Regulation with Carbon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation, BENNET JONES: BLOG (Jan. 
3, 2018), https://www.bennettjones.com/en/Blogs-Section/Alberta-Replaces-Specified-Gas-
Emitters-Regulation-with-Carbon-Competitiveness-Incentive-Regulation 
[https://perma.cc/FSK2-DZM2].  
68 British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, BRITISH COLUMBIA, 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/climate-change/planning-and-
action/carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/S5AM-7TCR].  
69 Lowey, supra note 65. The IEA report discussed above also provided an analysis of the 
impacts and potential for an EITE policy in the cement industry. See BARON ET AL., supra 
note 13, at 52–56. See also Vidal, supra note 44 for a discussion of the GHG impacts of 
cement.  
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policies), including those that economically rely heavily on fossil fuel 
production.70  
Judging by the previous examples, it is evident that a carbon controlling 
regime and any associated EITE policy will often be politically controversial 
and a likely target of vested interests. By contrast with these attempts to limit 
GHG emissions, Minnesota’s EITE rate is unique as it only increases 
carbon pollution and is not controversial among either of the state’s main 
political parties. However, not everyone has weighed in on this stand-out 
EITE policy. As discussed more fully below, perhaps it will prove true, as 
one commentator foresaw, that “political differences aside, trade policy will 
have a critical role in the emerging carbon-restricting economy.”71 
III. MINNESOTA’S UNIQUE EITE POLICY 
Minnesota does not mine or drill for fossil fuels,72 but nonetheless has 
a long history of resource extraction in various forms.73 Minnesota is 
currently the only state with significant iron mining capacity74 but 
 
70 In 2017, the province of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Premier announced he would be 
imposing a carbon price in keeping with national federal guidelines by 2018. Newfoundland 
and Labrador’s Carbon Pricing Plan to be Unveiled Next Spring: Ball, THE TELEGRAM (Oct. 
31, 2017), https://www.thetelegram.com/business/newfoundlands-carbon-pricing-plan-to-be-
unveiled-next-spring-ball-158276/ [https://perma.cc/K7PK-79Y3]. He announced that the 
carbon price would “tak[e] into consideration what is happening in our offshore”—a 
reference to the oil platforms that produce a considerable amount of the province’s 
economic activity. Id. But less than one year later, the same Premier, who had obtained a 
federal extension to plan his province’s compliance with the national carbon plan, balked 
and said that if any other province opted out of the national plan his province would as well. 
David Maher, Newfoundland and Labrador Carbon Pricing Plan on Thin Ice, THE 
WESTERN STAR (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.thewesternstar.com/news/local/newfoundland-
and-labrador-carbon-pricing-plan-on-thin-ice-238416/ [https://perma.cc/BH7K-HPTA]. 
71 Colares, supra note 48, at 442. 
72 Setting aside peat mining, which is a going concern in Minnesota. See Peat: The Forgotten 
Fossil Fuel, NAT’L. GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/media/peat-forgotten-
fuel/ [https://perma.cc/S3HN-E7R6] (describing how peat might be viewed as a “fossil fuel”); 
see also Permit to Mine - Peat, MINN. DEP’T. OF NAT. RES., https://mn.gov/elicense/a-
z/?id=1083-231014#/list/appId//filterType//filterValue//page/1/sort//order/ 
[https://perma.cc/MXG3-8ZSP] (describing the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources’ peat mining permitting regime). 
73 Minnesota Mining History, MINN. DEP’T. OF NAT. RES., 
https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/education/geology/digging/history.html 
[https://perma.cc/XS3R-LY5P]; see also Supporting a Competitive Forest Industry, MINN. 
FOREST RES. COUNCIL, https://mn.gov/frc/forest-products-industry.html 
[https://perma.cc/7L2X-VMS6].  
74 Press Release, Iron Mining Ass’n. of Minn., Outlook Good for 2018 Minnesota Iron 
Shipments (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.taconite.org/news/latest/?273 
[https://perma.cc/8HL5-4G38] (describing how “[m]ore than 80% of iron mined in the 
United States comes from Minnesota. There is currently only one other operating iron mine 
in the nation”).  
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paradoxically has not parlayed this into the more profitable business of 
steelmaking.75 Even the most advanced iron processing facility ships its 
output to be processed into more valuable products.76 The state has a long 
history of logging and paper milling, industries that are still regionally 
significant although they are in decline.
77
 Additionally, Minnesota hosts 
numerous oil and gas pipelines that move fossil fuels produced in Alberta 
and North Dakota to refineries in across the Midwest and South, and with 
some additional steps, places like Singapore.78 While pipelines do not result 
in long-term employment or profits for many Minnesotans,79 they use a 
significant amount of electricity. Minnesota has two laws working in concert 
to increase the pollution output of these specially cared-for industries. 
A. Minnesota’s Efficiency Exemption 
Since 1997, Minnesota agencies have enforced and implemented a 
Conservation Improvement Program (CIP) that imposes duties on electric 
and natural gas utilities to increase efficiency across power grids, gas 
distribution systems, and among consumers in order to reduce wasted 
 
75 Dan Kraker, On the Iron Range, a Push for a New Kind of Iron, MINN. PUB. RADIO 
NEWS (June 24, 2015), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/06/24/taconite-mn 
[https://perma.cc/HPZ3-283X] (“For more than a century, iron ore mined from Minnesota's 
Iron Range has fed enormous blast furnaces at steel mills around the Great Lakes in old rust 
belt cities like Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland and Hamilton, Ontario.”). There is some small 
and specialized steel fabricating capacity around the Twin Cities, but nothing akin to the large 
steel mills that process Minnesota iron. See, e.g., LEJEUNE STEEL CO., 
https://www.lejeunesteel.com/ [https://perma.cc/67EL-BJSY] (fabricating over 40,000 tons of 
steel at sites in Minnesota and Wisconsin). 
76 Dan Kraker, Northern Minnesota. Iron Ore Mining Company Invests in Steel Industry’s 
Future, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/08/07/northshore-iron-ore-mining-company-
cleveland-cliffs-invests-in-steel-industry-future [https://perma.cc/29V4-KQ4N].  
77 Dan Kraker, Wood City: Cloquet Hopes to Keep its Identity After Country's Last 
Matchstick Factory Closes, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS. (June 19, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/06/19/cloquet-hopes-to-keep-identity-after-countrys-
last-matchstick-factory-closes [https://perma.cc/K9MN-GXL9]. The Minnesota paper 
milling industry also claims to be far more environmentally responsible and efficient than its 
foreign competitors. See Cloquet: The Industry Standard for Environmental Performance, 
SAPPI, https://www.sappi.com/cloquet-industry-standard-environmental-performance 
[https://perma.cc/76X3-PH6V].  
78 In the Matter of the Application of Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership for a Certificate 
of Need for the Line Three Replacement Project in Minnesota, Direct Testimony of Dr. 
Marie Fagen, at 20, PL9/CN-14-916, (Minn. P.U.C. Sept. 11, 2017). 
79 Enbridge projects the new Line 3 oil pipeline project will employ between zero and twenty 
full-time permanent employees. Under cross examination, its expert estimated between five 
and twenty. See In the Matter of the Application of Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership 
for a Certificate of Need for the Line Three Replacement Project in Minnesota, Office of 
Administrative Hearings Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation, at ¶ 
904, PL-9/CN-14-916 (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 23, 2018) [hereinafter PUC Line Three Findings 
of Fact].  
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energy resources.
80
 For the sake of this discussion, it is relevant that the law 
effectively excepted many heavy-energy-use industries (e.g., iron, paper, and 
pipelines) from CIP standards.
81
 Under the CIP, eligible “large customer 
facilities” include: 
all buildings, structures, equipment, and installations at a single 
site that collectively (1) impose a peak electrical demand on an 
electric utility’s system of not less than 20,000 kilowatts, measured 
in the same way as the utility that serves the customer facility 
measures electrical demand for billing purposes, or (2) consume 
not less than 500 million cubic feet of natural gas annually. In 
calculating peak electrical demand, a large customer facility . . . if 
engaged in mineral extraction, may aggregate peak energy 
demand from the large customer facility’s mining and processing 
operations.82 
These large customer facilities can petition the Commissioner of the 
Minnesota Department of Commerce “to exempt both electric and gas 
utilities serving the large customer facility from the investment and 
expenditure requirements” that otherwise require those utilities to invest in 
energy conservation improvements.83 Instead of abiding by statewide 
standards, the petitioners must present some evidence of how they’re 
attempting to save energy as they see fit.84  
Once the CIP exemption is granted, the customer will not have to fund 
and the utility cannot be required to invest in energy conservation programs 
that would benefit the large customer.85 This means that unlike all other 
utility customers in the state, the excepted largest users of electricity and gas 
receive no incentives or utility assistance to conserve energy. And then 
under EITE, they are further incentivized to use as much electricity and gas 
as possible to maximize output and profit. 
 
80 Conservation Improvement Program, MINN. COMMERCE DEP’T, 
https://mn.gov/commerce/industries/energy/utilities/cip/ [https://perma.cc/JX5A-QR5J]; 
SHELDON STROM, CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, MINNESOTA’S NEXT GENERATION ENERGY 
ACT OF 2007, at 14 (2007), 
https://aceee.org/files/pdf/conferences/eer/2007/STROMbs1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3GT-
M63P]. For a description of any utility’s required regular filings under the law and their 
detailed requirements, see MINN. R. § 7690.0500.  
81 See MINN. STAT. § 216B.241 (2019).  
82 Id. at subdiv. 1(h)(2)(i). 
83 Id. at subdiv. 1a(a)–(b). 
84 “The filing must include a discussion of the competitive or economic pressures facing the 
owner of the facility and the efforts taken by the owner to identify, evaluate, and implement 
energy conservation and efficiency improvements.” Id. at subdiv. 1a(b). 
85 Id. at subdiv. 2(d) (“A public utility may not spend for or invest in energy conservation 
improvements that directly benefit a large energy facility or a large electric customer facility 
for which the commissioner has issued an exemption pursuant to subdivision 1a, paragraph 
(b).”). 
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B. Minnesota’s EITE Statute 
The EITE statute creates a similar category of large customer facilities 
that overlaps in some ways with the CIP exemptions. This short law appears 
supportive of “clean energy technology” on its face.86 Unfortunately, looks 
can be deceiving.  
The EITE statute delineates its policy justification in a findings section: 
It is the energy policy of the state of Minnesota to ensure 
competitive electric rates for energy-intensive trade-exposed 
customers. To achieve this objective, an investor-owned electric 
utility that has at least 50,000 retail electric customers, but no 
more than 200,000 retail electric customers, shall have the ability 
to propose various EITE rate options within their service territory 
under an EITE rate schedule that include, but are not limited to, 
fixed-rates, market-based rates, and rates to encourage utilization 
of new clean energy technology.87 
Compared to other Minnesota laws on utility regulation,88 this drafting 
is strange. It includes a general “policy of the state” section that functions as 
a definition that omits the state’s largest utility, Xcel Energy (which has more 
than 200,000 retail electric customers and therefore is not covered by this 
law), the primary Minnesota utility furthering “new clean energy 
technology.”89 Because of that omission, this law applies only to two utilities: 
Minnesota Power and Otter Tail Power. Both lag far behind Xcel in 
adopting either renewable energy90 or relying on “clean energy technology” 
as defined in the section (including nuclear power).91  
Another odd feature for a utility rate statute, the next section creates a 
blanket exception to the reasonable ratemaking provisions of Minnesota 
law.  It effectively excepts utilities that propose an EITE rate from having to 
prove most of the ordinary elements and meet the fundamental fairness 
 
86 Id. at subdiv. 2(a).  
87 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1696, subdiv. 2(a).  
88 Many, though not all, of the relevant statutes are long, convoluted, and comprehensive. 
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 216B.2422, 216B.243, 216B.16 (2019). 
89 Wind Power, XCEL ENERGY, 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/Energy_Portfolio/Renewable_Energy/Wind 
[https://perma.cc/6AS3-NGFC] (“As a national leader in wind power for over a decade, 
more than 20 percent of our energy supply company-wide comes from wind energy — about 
seven times the wind generation on our system than in 2005.”). 
90 For example, Minnesota Power’s 2015 Integrated Resource Plan (a mandatory planning 
process which all three investor-owned utilities implement and submit to the PUC for 
approval) indicates that it intends to avoid buying any additional wind power unless it is 
punished with a “carbon regulation penalty.” See In the Matter of Minnesota Power’s 
Application for Approval of its 2015-2029 Resource Plan, Minnesota Power’s 2015 
Integrated Resource Plan, at 63, E015/RP-15-690, (Minn. P.U.C. Sept. 15, 2015). 
91 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1696, subdiv. 1(b). The only two nuclear power plants in Minnesota 
are owned by Xcel. See Nuclear Energy, XCEL ENERGY, 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/energy_portfolio/electricity/nuclear [https://perma.cc/M9V4-
4MX9].  
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requirements of a ratemaking proposal.92 All ratemaking decisions are 
normally made by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC or Commission), 
an independent Minnesota agency93 (discussed further below). For the 
EITE rate, instead of subjecting utility applications to the normal discretion 
and expertise of Commissioners—determining, for example, what is 
“reasonable” or what are discriminatory rates—this statute seeks to limit the 
agency’s discretion, commanding it “shall, upon a finding of net benefit to 
the utility or the state, approve an EITE rate schedule and any 
corresponding EITE rate.”94 As the Commission summarized in 
implementing the law: 
The language of Minn. Stat. § 216B.1696, subd. 2 therefore 
expressly limits Commission consideration of a proposed EITE 
rate schedule to whether the rate schedule and corresponding 
rate results in a net benefit to the utility or the state. In particular, 
the Commission must evaluate the proposed EITE rate schedule 
and rates notwithstanding the ordinary legislative prohibition 
against unreasonably preferential or prejudicial rates, or the 
ordinary requirement that every rate be just and reasonable. In 
addition, the Commission must evaluate the EITE rate schedule 
and rates notwithstanding section 216B.03’s ordinary 
requirement to set rates that advance Minnesota’s energy 
conservation and renewable energy goals “to the maximum 
reasonable extent.”95 
Far from encouraging clean energy development, the EITE rate 
explicitly disallows considering either the conservation or renewable energy 
goals set by the Legislature and applicable to other Commission rate 
decisions. 
Exceptional provisions and exceptions continue in this short provision. 
This statute requires the PUC to make a decision on a miscellaneous filing 
on an EITE rate within ninety days, in an apparent attempt to keep such 
rates out of the periodically-held rate cases that utilities must otherwise bring 
 
92 § 216B.1696, subdiv. 2(b) (creating an exception to the application of the “Reasonable 
Rate” statute, normal filing requirements, a prohibition on charging different customers more 
for the same service, antidiscrimination prohibitions against “unreasonable preference or 
advantage to any person or subject any person to any unreasonable prejudice or 
disadvantage,” and the normal hearing procedure for a rate change). 
93 See infra Section III.C. 
94 § 216B.1696, subdiv. 2(b).  
95 In the Matter of a Revised Petition by Minnesota Power for a Competitive Rate for Energy-
Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) and an EITE Cost Recovery Rider, Order Approving 
EITE Rate, Establishing Cost Recovery Proceeding, and Requiring Additional Filings, at 4, 
E-015/M-16-564 (Minn. P.U.C. Dec. 21, 2016) (citation omitted) [hereinafter PUC Order 
Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate]. 
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in order to increase their rates across their customer classes.96 The statute 
also protects both EITE customers and statutorily-defined low-income 
customers from adjustments from the EITE rate,97 essentially passing all 
costs and potential savings of the rate onto the remaining customers who are 
neither EITE entities nor the lowest-earning Minnesotans.98 
This statute’s purpose statement defined one of three investor-owned 
utilities out of the EITE program, and its definition of EITE customers 
further focuses the benefit on a small list of companies. The EITE statute 
defines these eligible EITE customers as:  
(1) an iron mining extraction and processing facility, including a 
scram mining facility as defined in Minnesota Rules, part 
6130.0100, subpart 16; 
(2) a paper mill, wood products manufacturer, sawmill, or 
oriented strand board manufacturer; 
(3) a steel mill and related facilities; and 
(4) a retail customer of an investor-owned electric utility that has 
facilities under a single electric service agreement that: (i) 
collectively imposes a peak electrical demand of at least 10,000 
kilowatts on the electric utility's system, (ii) has a combined annual 
average load factor in excess of 80 percent, and (iii) is subject to 
globally competitive pressures and whose electric energy costs are 
at least ten percent of the customer’s overall cost of production.99 
Because of the generic fourth prong of the definition, the EITE regime 
can be used to provide an EITE rate to a pipeline or new mining projects 
in Minnesota—such as the proposed projects for copper and nickel sulfide 
mines by PolyMet,100 Twin Metals,101 and other mining companies currently 
 
96 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1696, subdiv. 2(c); id. at subdiv. 2(d) (discussing cost recovery and 
allocation of savings to customers between general rate cases); id. (laying out requirements 
for a utility rate change). 
97 Id. at subdiv. 2(d), 3. It also requires the utility in question make a small investment in 
programs for low-income customers. See id. The statute also allows the Department of 
Commerce to collect money from the utilities for its additional work in overseeing EITE 
rates but caps the amount of recovery. See id. at subdiv. 4.  
98 For a representation of the proximity between poverty and power plants in northern 
Minnesota, see Power Plants and Environmental Justice, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL 
AGENCY, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/power-plants-and-environmental-justice 
[https://perma.cc/T78S-DT4V].  
99 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1696, subdiv. 1.  
100 NorthMet Mining and Land Exchange Final Environmental Impact Statement (Final 
EIS), MINN. DEPT. OF NAT. RES., 
https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/input/environmentalreview/polymet/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/RPB2-M2HE].  
101 Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, to the 
Director of the Bureau of Land Mgmt., (Mar. 8, 2016), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37036.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK46-
SMEL]. But see U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NE. STATES DIST. 
OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, ADDITION OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR 
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eyeing Minnesota for precious metals mining102—but cannot be used by 
otherwise qualified businesses that fall outside of Minnesota Power’s or 
Otter Tail Power’s  service areas.103  
The law’s legislative history brings this point home. An earlier version 
of the bill explicitly named seven classes of recipients including “copper, 
nickel, or precious metals mining extraction and processing facilit[ies]; . . . 
oil and liquids pipeline[s]; . . . [and] ceiling panel manufacturers” in addition 
to those defined above.104 The earlier version of the EITE customer 
definition was clearer in its intent to benefit “globally competitive electric 
utility customer[s]” and lower their “overall cost of production.”105 
However, in the earlier “policy of the state” version, there was not an 
exception for Xcel.106 Apparently, the law was scaled back to subsidize 
businesses in rural Minnesota rather than across the entire state. This earlier 
draft’s companion bill had identical language, suggesting the as-passed 
legislation did not result from reconciling the two chambers’ different 
visions.107 
What is glaringly absent from the prior versions of the bill and the 
statute that ultimately passed is any mechanism that would support “clean 
energy technology,” one of the stated purposes of the bill. Indeed, 
considering the special preference given to industries with significant sunk 
costs in old polluting technologies and the decision to apply the statute only 
to the two investor-owned utilities in the state that are slow to adopt clean 
 
RENEWAL OF HARDROCK LEASES, MNES 001352 AND MNES 001353 (Dec. 2018), 
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/projects/nepa/98730/164517/200658/DraftEA_TwinMetalsLeaseRenewal_2019_12_
20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TSF-AQD4].  
102 See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T. OF NAT. RES., MINERALS EXPLORATION PLAN ON STATE 
NONFERROUS METALLIC MINERALS LEASES: KENNECOTT EXPLORATION COMPANY’S 
EXPLORATION PLAN (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/lands_minerals/exp_plans/20160331_kennecott.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YNM4-8TPF]. 
103 For example, since Xcel Energy’s customers are excluded from this potential subsidy, the 
EITE regime cannot provide a reduced rate to Minnesota’s two oil refineries, both Xcel 
customers. See Communities Served, XCEL ENERGY, 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/energy_portfolio/communities_served [https://perma.cc/53VS-
2UEP]; ANDEAVOR, ST. PAUL PARK REFINERY FACT SHEET (Aug. 2018), 
http://andeavor.com/media/1395/andv_stpaulpark_factsheet-082118.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LQY2-5ZVJ] (“The St. Paul Park Refinery (SPPR) occupies 
approximately 170 acres along the Mississippi River southeast of St. Paul Park, 
Minnesota[.]”); About Us, FLINT HILLS RES., https://pinebendrefinery.com/pine-bend-mn-
oil-refinery/ [https://perma.cc/S5WC-34T3] (“Located 17 miles southeast of Minneapolis, 
the Flint Hills Resources Pine Bend refinery is a landmark like no other in Minnesota.”).  
104 S.F. 1312, 89th Leg. (Minn. 2015). 
105 Id. (noting the original wording is “any other globally competitive electric utility customer 
whose energy costs are a significant portion of the customer’s overall cost of production.”).  
106 Id.  
107 See H.F. 1782, 89th Leg. (Minn. 2015). 
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energy and have little carbon-free generation capacity in place, the EITE 
statute does not seem to foster change so much as cementing a status quo. 
To the extent that it could have been used to support technological 
innovation,108 that is not how it has played out in the two utilities’ proposed 
rates under the statute. The implementation of the EITE statute in the first 
EITE rate approved by regulators demonstrates how far this law is from the 
pollution-limiting model that other jurisdictions and the IEA proposed. 
C. EITE Implementation at the Minnesota PUC 
For better or worse, Minnesota’s climate change policy and progress 
goes through its PUC. This agency is the principal point of contact for 
exerting statutory climate change reduction goals109 on regulated utilities110—
until recently Minnesota’s largest source of GHG pollution.111 It is also 
where the legislature has required agency action on electric vehicle–
supportive energy rates,112 renewable energy adoption,113 and energy 
conservation—with the CIP program (partly administered by the 
Department of Commerce but relevant to PUC decisions) being an across-
the-board thumb on the scale for more efficient energy use for almost every 
utility customer in the state. The Commission has been successful in some 
respects and has moved slowly on others; it has approved both significant 
renewable energy advances114 and a tar sands pipeline that will more than 
offset the GHG emissions avoided by all of the PUC’s greener actions.115 It 
 
108 While Minnesota Power and Otter Tail Power only proposed EITE rate subsidies for 
large customers, if either had wanted to promote innovation or conservation they might have 
conditioned the rate on adopting certain measures. But there is no reason to expect these 
utilities to act as regulators or avoid maximizing sales, so the real-world outcome is the logical 
product of letting these companies propose their own EITE rates without any PUC oversight 
using ratemaking laws that promote conservation and fairness. 
109 MINN. STAT. § 216H.02 (2007).  
110 MINN. STAT. §§ 216B.2422, subdiv. 2C, 216B.2422, subdiv. 4. 
111 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/greenhouse-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/A7R6-
VBM3] (stating that under “Change in emissions by sectors, 2005-2016,” only the 
transportation industry emitted more GHGs than the electrical generation industry). 
112 MINN. STAT. § 216B.1614.  
113 MINN. STAT. § 216B.243, subdiv. 3a.  
114 For a discussion of the Commission’s role in the “renewable energy revolution” see Jacob 
B. Shoop, The Rise of Renewables and Distributed Generation in Minnesota, 41 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1691, 1692 (2015). 
115 In the matter of the Application of Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership for a Certificate 
of Need for the Line Three Replacement Project in Minnesota, Order Granting Certificate 
of Need as Modified and Requiring Filings, at 29, PL-9/CN-14-916, (Minn. P.U.C. Sept. 5, 
2018); see PUC Line Three Findings of Fact, supra note 79, at ¶ 676 (“The ALJ accepts 
these calculations as established in fact and adopts the finding of the incremental life-cycle 
GHG emissions (GHGe) for the [Line 3 Replacement] Project will be 193 million tons of 
carbon dioxide emissions (CO2e), totaling $287 billion in social costs.”). At the time of 
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is in this agency—one never designed to be the principal pollution control 
agency for the state116—where the EITE statute landed, causing more than 
the normal amount of regulatory trepidation.  
When the EITE statute arrived at the PUC, it created more conflict 
than is customary in a body that usually rules by consensus. The PUC deals 
with technical issues that are often difficult to get excited about.117 This law 
was different than most that it administers, however, and its difference 
resulted in several obstacles on the road to implementation that are worth 
discussing. 
1. Two EITE Rate Proposals  
The first application for an EITE rate structure was submitted by 
Minnesota Power. It was rejected by the Commission without prejudice—
allowing the company to come back with a refiled petition for the same 
rate.118 The reason for its rejection was that Minnesota Power did not make 
the necessary showing of a net benefit either to the state or the utility.119 
Moreover, as proposed, the EITE rate would have slapped small customers 
(residential customers and all but the largest businesses in Minnesota 
Power’s service territory) with up to 14.5% increases in their energy rates to 
 
writing, this approval was the subject of litigation, having been reversed by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals. Dan Kraker, MN Court says PUC Didn’t Weigh Oil Spill Impact in Line 
3 Pipeline Decision, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS. (June 3, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/06/03/line3-oil-pipeline-minnesota-court-
environement-spill-impact [https://perma.cc/F73Y-NQPN]. 
116 The clearest responsibility for protecting natural resources and preventing pollution 
resides with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources, 
and Environmental Quality Board. See Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 882, 1967 MINN. LAWS 
1845. See also GREG BREINING, MINN. DEP. NAT. RES., MANAGING MINNESOTA’S 
NATURAL RESOURCES: THE DNR’S FIRST 50 YEARS, 1931-1981, at 1 (Robert Kraske ed., 
1981), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061219122712/http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/aboutdnr/history/
dnr.html [https://perma.cc/SZV6-S9RG]. 
117 As a former Chair of the Commission recounted, meetings would normally cover 
something like “hedge contracts for natural gas, what proportion of the purchases of natural 
gas should a natural gas company be able to hedge, what’s the price they’re paying, what kind 
of long term contracts do they have,” and acknowledged that the highly formal and technical 
nature of the meetings, render them difficult for the public to engage with. Dan Kraker, Line 
3 Fight Brings PUC Higher Profile, Lots of Applicants, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Jan. 9, 
2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/01/09/line-3-fight-brings-puc-higher-profile-lots-
of-applicants [https://perma.cc/U6QX-4D6E]. 
118 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 1. 
119 Id. 
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pay the discount for a handful of large customers, an outcome that was 
understandably unpopular.120 
The second application was filed in the summer of 2016 to address 
these identified deficiencies. It was strongly supported by the few customers 
who would benefit from the rate decrease121 and was opposed by consumer 
advocate organizations with concerns on behalf of low income and elderly 
residential customers.122 Environmental groups also filed comments and 
reply comments in opposition to the proposed EITE rate.123 On the other 
side, some of the legislators who had authored the EITE statute wrote in 
support of Minnesota Power’s application.124 
Far from encouraging clean energy development, Minnesota Power’s 
proposal was an across-the-board discount for its largest customers, paid for 
by the residential customers that make up most of the population of 
northern Minnesota.125 While most these residents are not identified by 
Minnesota Power as “low-income”—which would have protected them 
somewhat from an unreasonable rate increase—there are large amounts of 
impoverished rural customers in the utility’s service area particularly 
vulnerable to a rate shock.126 The state’s data on Environmental Justice and 
 
120 David Shaffer, Iron Range Mines and Mills Slated for Electric Rate Relief that Will Boost 
Homeowners’ Bills, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/iron-range-
mines-and-mills-slated-for-electric-rate-relief-that-will-boost-homeowners-bills/347709291/ 
[https://perma.cc/AQG3-97CX]. 
121 Since the Commission rejected the first application, Minnesota Power’s largest customers 
were motivated to lobby for their subsidized energy rate. Companies supporting Minnesota 
Power’s application played up its economic benefits because “for many EITE customers 
energy costs amount to approximately 20–25% of the cost of the goods they produce.” PUC 
Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 8.  
122  Id. at 1–2. Consumer advocates and the Minnesota Office of the Attorney General 
asserted that there was no showing of a net benefit because the costs of the EITE rate were 
not sufficiently addressed. Id. at 8. Environmental parties highlighted the fact that the 
cost/benefit analysis ignored environmental costs and that the EITE customers could have 
otherwise obtained the same benefits by investing in energy efficiency at their facilities. Id. 
The parties opposing the proposal also pointed out the limited time permitted to review the 
application, the need for oversight tracking the rate’s effectiveness, and the need to review 
the rate before the company’s next general rate case. Id.  
123 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 2.  
124 “On September 14, 2016, the Commission received a letter supporting the petition from 
State Senators Thomas Bakk, Tom Saxhaug, and David Tomassoni, and State 
Representatives Rob Ecklund, Dale Lueck, and Jason Metsa.” PUC Order Approving 
Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 2; see also S.F. 1312, 89th Sess. (Minn. 2015) 
(listing Senate authors Tomassoni, Bakk, Saxhaug, Hoffman, and Rosen). 
125 Id. at 4–5. 
126 Compare MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, supra note 98 (showing large swathes 
of northern Minnesota census tracts where the poverty levels are high enough to be labeled 
Environmental Justice areas by the Pollution Control Agency, which also designates Tribal 
Land as an EJ areas), with Coverage Map, MINN. POWER, 
https://mnpower.com/Company/CoverageMap [https://perma.cc/8R8V-YBN8] (showing 
Minnesota Power’s service area includes many of the same areas). 
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Native communities overlaps significantly with Minnesota Power’s service 
area: 
 
 
Map Comparison127 
 
Unprotected residential customers would have to pay up to 10% more 
on their bills to cover the EITE rate.128 Also, rates were projected to rise on 
general service, large light and power, and municipal customers—
demonstrating that most businesses, local governments, and city street light 
 
127 Id. 
128 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 5. 
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payments would be tapped for the discount given to EITE customers.129 
The benefit of the EITE rate would be offered to only eleven identified 
customers.130 The rate would end after four years,131 requiring Minnesota 
Power to reapply to renew this discount. However, because the Commission 
ultimately approved the initial program, it seems likely that in years to come 
the utility would successfully make its case for a renewal rate supported by 
data showing similar net benefit to its business.  
In order to succeed where it had failed the first time, Minnesota Power 
had to show that it would “benefit” from the EITE rate in order to get the 
Commission’s approval. It did so by characterizing increased energy use and 
waste as a benefit: “According to the Company, the proposal would provide 
a net benefit to the utility in large part by increasing revenue from electricity 
sales to large industrial customers. The Company expects that the rate 
reduction would cause an increase in EITE customers’ electric 
consumption.”132 Minnesota Power estimated an $80 million benefit from 
additional electricity sales to EITE customers and from money clawed back 
from non-EITE customers with $40 million lost in fuel costs and disgorged 
to the EITE customers in their rate discount, giving it an overall “benefit” 
of $40 million additional profit.133 It also suggested that the EITE rate would 
increase overall economic activity benefitting the state.134 Analysis by the 
Minnesota Department of Commerce, meant to check the company’s 
numbers for the Commission, similarly looked at economic benefit to the 
company (also concluding that non-EITE customers would have to cover 
Minnesota Power’s losses on increased rates), but failed to identify issues 
like environmental costs, and did not review whether there was any actual 
benefit to the state.135  
2. The PUC’s Approval of Minnesota Power’s EITE Rate 
At the Commission’s hearing on the proposal, things became heated. 
U.S. Steel’s representative told the Commission that he would never ask for 
a “subsidy” to do business, and Commissioner Tuma informed him that the 
rate he was asking to be approved to benefit his company’s operations was 
 
129 Id. at 6. This would likely lead to increases in property taxes and cost of living as these 
costs were passed along to the same residents paying more for their own electricity. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 5. 
132 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 6. 
133 Id. The company also asserted less tangible benefits including “financial strength, credit 
rating, and access to capital” resulting from more certain demand from its largest customers. 
Id. at 10. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 See PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 7 (noting 
customers would not be able to reduce their electricity usage, so the utility would continue 
to bill them the upcharge as projected: “In the Department’s view, because elasticity of 
demand for electricity is ‘rather low,’ the effect of price increases on non-EITE customers 
would not result in a meaningfully large cost to the utility.”). 
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indeed a subsidy.136 The two did not ultimately resolve this disagreement;137 
however, outside the EITE rate proceeding, U.S. Steel tells its investors that 
low energy prices maintain profitability at its iron facilities.
138
 Commission 
Chairperson Heydinger also laid out the weakness of the evidence and the 
significant red flags that normally would have been taken more seriously in 
a normal Commission rate hearing.139 
Considering the many different arguments and perspectives, the PUC 
narrowly found in favor of Minnesota Power’s proposed EITE rate. In 
doing so, the Commission underlined how the statute required it to 
disregard prohibitions on prejudicial or unreasonable rates and to ignore 
the normal requirements to consider both energy conservation and 
development of renewable energy to the maximum extent.140 The order 
continued: 
In other words, the governing statute precludes the Commission 
from “balancing the interests of the utility companies, their 
shareholders, and their customers to ensure that rates are ‘just 
and reasonable’” as the Commission does routinely in rate 
proceedings. Instead, the statute directs the Commission only to 
consider the interests of the utility, or the state, and to determine 
 
136 Commission PUC Agenda Meeting on 2016-09-15 9:30 AM, MINN. PUB. UTILS. 
COMM’N, at 5:00:00 (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://minnesotapuc.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=525 
[https://perma.cc/ZP4P-535D] [hereinafter September 2016 PUC Agenda Meeting]. 
137 Describing himself as a “prairie populist” Commissioner Tuma explained “you have an 
oversupply and what you’re asking under this rate to produce at max capacity.” Id. at 4:58:40. 
The representative instead suggested: “This energy rate is paramount to our operations 
moving forward competitively with the consideration of the severe overcapacity of global 
markets. For us to stay even at the current levels we are at in Minnesota, it’s paramount we 
receive a fair and competitive rate structure to move forward.” Id. at 4:57:50. Depending on 
who you agree with, a public subsidy of uneconomic overproduction at below-market energy 
rates is apparently also explainable as a commodity-producing company’s fair and 
competitive global market participation.  
138 Maintaining low energy prices is a top goal of U.S. Steel because it is important to the 
bottom line. A 2017 First Quarter Earnings Presentation mentioned maintaining current 
energy prices as one of just a few conditions required to ensure the company hit $260 million 
in net annual earnings. U.S. STEEL CORP., FIRST QUARTER 2017: EARNINGS PRESENTATION 
3 (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.ussteel.com/sites/default/files/reports_filings/USS%20Earnings%20Call%20Slid
es [https://perma.cc/2EMA-NNYM] (“If market conditions, which include spot prices, raw 
material costs, customer demand, import volumes, supply chain inventories, rig counts and 
energy prices, remain at their current levels, we expect: . . . 2017 net earnings of 
approximately $260 million, or $1.50 per share.”). 
139 September 2016 PUC Agenda Meeting, supra note 136, at 7:08:00–7:14:30. 
140 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 4 (and 
accompanying block quote). 
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if a proposed EITE rate schedule would be a net benefit to one 
of them.141 
Even under that pro-utility-profit reading of the law, only three of the 
Commissioners voted that Minnesota Power had made the necessary 
showing.142 The order approving Minnesota Power’s EITE rate states that 
the Commission found that the company showed that it would benefit from 
the rate, but it required additional filings on the issue of cost recovery.143 
The Commission accepted the EITE customers’ assertion that cheaper 
electricity will have a “positive impact . . . on their production by lowering 
their cost of producing goods[.]”144 The Commission further supported its 
finding by stating: “Reduced energy costs will likely be a factor in keeping 
EITE customers viable in competitive markets and therefore remain in 
operation as Minnesota Power customers.”145 These findings go beyond any 
assumption of a net benefit to the utility from increased revenues. It seems 
that a significant part of the benefit of this rate, according to the decision 
makers, was that a subsidy for producers and shippers of commodities 
would make them more competitive in international commodity markets. 
Subsequent to this order and consistent with the Commissioners’ 
assumptions, the Commission accepted the parties’ argument that the EITE 
rate did in fact contribute to the re-opening of the Keetac mine,146 owned 
by U.S. Steel and discussed further below.147 
In this proceeding, the Commission declined to look at whether the 
EITE rate would be a net benefit or loss to the state as a whole,148 and 
punted on whether the rate was economical. It explained that it made no 
finding on whether the EITE rate was “competitive,” asserting that, 
“Though ‘competitive electric rates’ is a stated policy objective of the EITE 
statute, the Legislature also stated that EITE rate options are the means to 
accomplish the objective, and stated under what circumstances those EITE 
rate options must be approved.”149 Additionally, the Commission declined 
to find that the EITE rate was in the public interest by normal legal 
standards used by the agency.150 Instead, the Commission required 
Minnesota Power to file annual reports justifying the continued use of the 
EITE rate with a specific emphasis on the economic impact of the rate. 
Among the reporting requirements, the company must: 
 
141 Id. (citation omitted). 
142 September 2016 PUC Agenda Meeting, supra note 136, at 7:22:00. 
143 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 9.  
144 Id. at 10. 
145 Id. at 10. 
146 Id. at 6–7. 
147 See infra text accompanying notes 302–04. 
148 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 11 n.22. 
149 Id. at 11. 
150 Id. at 11 (“Read as a whole, the statute reflects a legislative determination that, by satisfying 
the net benefit test, an EITE rate schedule is deemed consistent with the public interest.”). 
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Provide an update on EITE customers’ operations, including 
production levels, employment levels, economic factors and 
competitive conditions, and taxes paid . . . contain a statement of 
Minnesota Power’s view of regional economic conditions; and . . 
. include state agency or similar economic data on the condition 
of the regional economy.151  
In this way, the Commission gave its regulatory role of assessing the 
competitiveness of a rate to a private party, the utility—Minnesota Power 
must assess and justify the EITE rate with showings that the rate is increasing 
production and boosting economic activity that would not otherwise occur. 
3. Commissioners’ Significant Disagreements  
This PUC order came with a dissent. Dissents are not common at the 
PUC, a body that often makes decisions by consensus. Even though the 
Commission voted 3-2 to approve the proposed rate, Committee 
Chairperson Heydinger and Commissioner Tuma wrote separately to 
indicate that the utility had failed to properly assess the issues as required 
by law.152 They determined that Minnesota Power did not adequately show 
a net benefit because the “proposal did not address the cost side as well as 
the benefit side of the cost/benefit ledger.”153 The negative impacts on 
ratepayers paying more for no benefit, and impacts to the environment, 
were costs that the utility did not address or quantify.154 They also asserted 
that the EITE customers were already mostly operating at full capacity and 
there was “no analysis in the record showing that the rate discount would 
affect production levels.”155 They noted that Minnesota Power could offer 
an EITE rate to new customers who would actually be able to show 
measurable growth, but instead chose to offer a rate to its eleven largest 
existing customers to maintain existing operations.156 They also highlighted 
the fact that there was no accounting for the rate shock that would impact 
residential customers, who now had to pay 10% more for electricity, and 
that the company had not actually identified the low-income population that 
would need to be shielded from increases according to the law.157 While not 
covered in depth in this article, the Commission has continued to interpret 
 
151 Id. at 13. 
152 PUC Order Approving Minnesota Power EITE Rate, supra note 95, at 15. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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the law and adjust the societal impacts of Minnesota Power’s proposed rate 
since approving it.158  
To summarize, in approving the first ever EITE rate under 
Minnesota’s EITE statute, the Commission approved what it admitted was 
a potentially noncompetitive and unreasonably discriminatory rate which 
abandoned most of its normal doctrines for setting reasonable rates. It also 
presumed that the rate would distort production to the extent that it would 
make unviable producers viable and would lead to higher production of 
commodities by greatly reducing a significant input cost for select customers. 
Additionally, the Commission seemed to condition future approval of 
renewal of such a rate on proof from EITE customers that the subsidy they 
were receiving was doing the trick—that it was having a provable impact on 
employment and production. Boosting local production with subsidies is 
often not supported by competitive trading partners, though, and as will be 
discussed in the context of iron and steel below,159 these requirements of 
the PUC seem to fly in the face of international trade law.160 But first this 
article discusses some of the impacts in Minnesota beyond the economic 
harm for rural ratepayers. 
IV. EITE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
All regulatory pollution limits are based on assumptions. For example, 
when establishing a technology-based standard for how much pollution a 
car can emit, it is necessary to first understand how often and how hard that 
car is going to be running. While a car that emits a pound of pollutant X 
per minute of normal operation might be acceptable if it runs for 60 minutes 
a day, pollution could nonetheless be significantly worse if that same car is 
 
158 In a subsequent order, the Commission made an adjustment to this last point that seemed 
significant to the participants. By requiring that profits from the EITE rate be used to offset 
residential ratepayers’ EITE overpayment, the Commission moderated one of the societal 
negatives of the proposed rate—as long as Minnesota Power receives increased revenues from 
new energy demands from EITE ratepayers, residential ratepayers are not forced to offset 
discounts given to EITE customers. In the Matter of Minn. Power’s Revised Petition for a 
Competitive Rate for Energy Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) Customers 
and an EITE Cost Recovery Rider, Order Authorizing Cost Recovery with Conditions, at 2–
3, E-015/M-16-564, (Minn. P.U.C. Apr. 20, 2017) (“[T]he Commission . . . directs the 
Company to refund to non-EITE customers any revenue increases resulting from increased 
sales to customers taking service under the EITE rate schedule . . . .”). EITE customers—
despite benefitting from a windfall at the potential expense of thousands of rural 
Minnesotans—have sued the Commission twice over how the residential paybacks are 
structured. See, e.g., Writ of Certiorari, Large Power Intervenors v. The Minn. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, No. A18-0184 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018); Oral Argument, In re. the 
Application of Minn. Power for Auth. to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv., No. A18-1029 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2019). These lawsuits have been unsuccessful. 
159 See infra Section IV.B. 
160 See infra note 265.  
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run 24 hours a day, emitting 24 times the pollution modeled.
161
 Similar to 
pushing an old polluting vehicle to work harder and longer than anyone 
thought possible when it was first built, the EITE rate changes the baseline 
assumptions underlying regulation of some of Minnesota’s biggest pollution 
sources.162 
This section briefly addresses the existing pollution impacts from some 
EITE rate entities that are likely to be increased and prolonged by keeping 
their facilities running at maximum capacity regardless of the market 
demand. Because the iron industry is the largest and one of the longest 
existing163 EITE rate beneficiary, this section focuses on these facilities 
rather than on all EITE recipients. 
A. Water Pollution from Iron Mining and Processing 
The EITE rate is a subsidization of electricity, but its impact can go 
well beyond the excess power generation that results from the subsidy. By 
keeping certain facilities operating at maximum output, the rate is likely to 
change the economics of operating long-term and could lead to otherwise 
uneconomic activity at plants and mines that might otherwise be idled or 
 
161 In a more complicated interaction, low gasoline prices have led Americans to purchase 
more inefficient vehicles, so while the EPA has set fuel efficiency standards for each car 
company’s fleet of vehicles, the individual choices of car buyers (itself influenced by larger 
economic forces and advertising) can significantly skew assumptions regarding how many 
efficient vehicles will be on the road. Regulating Minnesota’s 130 EPA-tracked major 
emitters of GHG is a significantly simpler task and should be easier to manage. 
162 The Trump Administration’s attempt to replace the Clean Power Plan stands as another 
contemporary example of underestimating baseline pollution and mortality rates. See Rama 
Zakaria, The Trump Administration’s Clean Power Plan Replacement – for Many States, 
Worse than Doing Nothing, ENVTL. DEF. FUND: CLIMATE 411 (Sept. 14, 2018), 
http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2018/09/14/the-trump-administrations-clean-power-plan-
replacement-for-many-states-worse-than-doing-nothing/ [https://perma.cc/7HNH-X6PR]. 
However, the EITE statute does not replace controls on pollution with weaker ones, rather 
it changes the rate at which controlled facilities are operating. Accordingly, it has not garnered 
the attention a wholesale rewriting of Minnesota’s pollution rules might have.  
163 Minnesota mining history, MINN. DEP’T NAT’L RES., 
https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/education/geology/digging/history.html 
[https://perma.cc/XS3R-LY5P]; see also Mineral Commodities Summary 2019, U.S. DEPT. 
OF THE INTERIOR, https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/mcs2019_all.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4V3-QVV5]. The Minnesota timber industry predates iron mining but 
does not face quite the same point-source pollution issues as the iron mining and processing 
industries. Timber pollution is spread over a wider area and water pollution impacts from 
logging are less well documented. Additionally, while Minnesota is the United States’ primary 
source for iron ore, the Minnesota timber industry is exposed to competition from logging 
in other states, so the EITE rate might have a more muted impact on this industry in 
Minnesota.  
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closed. 164 Indeed, the Commission’s decision to approve the first EITE rate 
appeared to be based on the promise that it would make then-nonviable 
facilities open and operate again.165 This is good news for a small and 
shrinking166 group of workers, but it also takes its toll on Minnesota’s water 
resources near such facilities, and consequently on the local people and 
wildlife.  
For example, well before the EITE rate was proposed, the state studied 
the overall water pollution impacts from U.S. Steel’s Minntac plant. Minntac 
currently benefits from the EITE rate. Back in 2004 it was established that 
the facility was polluting water past legal limits in watersheds where its 
tailings basin (the dump where its leftover waste rock and other wastes are 
discarded) was leaking out.167 In assessing a potential expansion of the mine 
in 2004, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (PCA) determined: 
The number of exceedances of water quality standards for sulfate, 
[total dissolved solids], specific conductance, and hardness are 
anticipated to increase at Station D-2 [in the Dark River] with the 
proposed [2500 gallons/minute] or [5000 gallons/minute] 
discharge. Manganese, which is currently exceeding standards, 
would continue to do so under either of the proposed discharge 
scenarios. Similarly, the data indicate that Station S-1 [in the 
Sandy River] would also experience increases in the numbers of 
exceedances of chloride, specific conductance, and hardness 
water quality standards. Based on these data, the Dark River and 
 
164 While plant expansion could involve the modernization of machinery and potential 
efficiency gains, in Minnesota the expansion of an iron mine means blasting and expanding 
an existing pit, which lengthens the viability of the equipment already in use. See generally 
John Myers, Minnesota Jack Pine Chopped Down Two Days After Setting State Record, 
DL-ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.dl-online.com/news/3719220-minnesota-jack-
pine-chopped-down-two-days-after-setting-state-record [https://perma.cc/GG36-QNT8].  
165 See infra text accompanying note 304, the Commission appeared to accept the reopening 
of Keetac as proof that the EITE rate was functioning as intended.  
166 Aaron Brown, Many New Jobs, Too Few Opportunities in NE Minn. Economy, STAR 
TRIB. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/many-new-jobs-too-few-opportunities-in-
ne-minn-economy/285943471/ [https://perma.cc/PN69-WEVK]. Ever since the EITE rate, 
and iron and steel tariffs supporting the industry have been in effect, some Minnesota 
facilities have lost money. Idled plants were subjected to the EITE rate and laid off dozens 
of employees. Layoffs Announced at two U.S. Steel Mines on Iron Range, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO NEWS (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/11/09/layoffs-
announced-at-two-us-steel-mines-on-iron-range. 
167 Minntac’s waste dump is built on the headwaters of both the Dark River and Sand River 
watersheds, which flow north towards the Boundary Waters and Canada. The entire facility 
also straddles the continental divide (including the mine and processing plant on the south 
side of the divide) and as a result, the facility pollutes three distinct watersheds from one 
relatively large point. 
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Sandy River do not have sufficient capacity to assimilate some key 
constituents without exceeding standards.
168
  
The PCA’s list of studied pollutants discharging from this facility is far 
from complete. The tailings basin also had the potential to indirectly 
increase the levels of toxic methylmercury in both watersheds, due to the 
interaction of its sulfate and mercury pollution discharges after they left the 
tailings basin.
169
  
These pollutants are dangerous to life. The mercury levels are high in 
the area around Minntac, and methylmercury is known to accumulate in 
fish in such a high level that eating just one can poison people or animals.
170
 
The available evidence of Minntac’s conditions lead the PCA to conclude 
“that a larger portion of the fish in downstream lakes could exceed health 
standards.”171 The agency also identified molybdenum as a pollution 
constituent of concern. While it did not apply a threshold to its analysis, it 
did note that it could be present in such high levels to kill animals as large 
as moose through molybdenosis.
172
 The agency summarized that increasing 
molybdenum, sulfur, and methylmercury discharge levels from Minntac 
could have consequences for downstream wildlife,
173
 and that exceedances 
of other measured pollutant discharges have also grown worse in the past 
fifteen years, multiplying the potential impacts to the environment and to 
the health of humans and wildlife.174 
As long as Minntac continues to operate without additional pollution 
control technology, or even a plan to adopt such technology sometime in 
the future, these impacts will continue and likely become worse under 
extended and increased production. While Minntac is a large facility even 
by taconite mining and processing standards, its water quality impacts are 
not significantly different from other similar facilities in the state.  
 
168 MWH, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, DRAFT MINNTAC WATER INVENTORY 
REDUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 5-34 (Sept. 2004), 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/minntac-deis.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB6W-
3ZZY]. 
169 Id. at 5-35. A full list of constituents of concern would include additional toxic metals. 
170 Id. (stating that one “normal” sized northern pike from these waters would exceed health 
limits for mercury). 
171 Id. at 5-35 to 5-36. 
172 Id. at 5-128. 
173 Id. at S-20 (“Potential chemical changes relating to levels of molybdenum, sulfur and 
methylmercury may have implications for downstream wildlife populations.”).  
174 The failure to prohibit these pollutant discharges consistent with the Clean Water Act 
resulted in two lawsuits against PCA. Marshall Helmberger, MPCA Sued Over Recent 
Decision to Issue New Water Discharge Permit, THE TIMBERJAY (Jan. 17, 2019) 
http://www.timberjay.com/stories/mpca-sued-over-recent-decision-to-issue-new-water-
discharge-permit,14746 [https://perma.cc/4NQW-G763] (“The new Minntac permit, issued 
Dec. 1, has also been challenged by the environmental group Water Legacy as well as the 
Fond du Lac Band of Ojibwe, both of which claim the new permit fails to comply with the 
federal Clean Water Act.”). 
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B. Climate Pollution’s Effects on Minnesotans  
Along with water quality impacts,175 Minnesota is also suffering from 
increasing impacts from climate change. Within 50 years, the effects of 
warming could change nearly all of Minnesota from a forest-suitable biome 
to one that only supports prairie habitat.176 Minnesota winters are also 
rapidly warming: “[W]inters between 1989 and 2018 were an average of 3 
degrees Fahrenheit warmer, compared to a 20th century baseline.”177 The 
Northern Great Plains region is warming faster than the rest of the country 
because of dry winter conditions, higher latitude, and its distance from 
coasts.178 Increased precipitation in the state increases the chances of floods, 
including those that could lead to mining facility disasters and pollution 
spills.179 
Often thought a generalized issue for later generations to deal with, 
climate change causes direct health harms that will increasingly disrupt the 
lives of Minnesotans.180 These impacts are well documented and have been 
backed up by a report from the U.S. government’s Global Change Research 
Program.181 Until recent rollbacks, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention actively treated climate change as a public health issue, pursuing 
initiatives to adapt to greater tick-borne disease and identify populations in 
 
175 Impaired Waters Viewer, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/water/impaired-waters-viewer-iwav [https://perma.cc/FUE5-
TZTM]; Raymond Grummey, A Tale of Two States, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.startribune.com/a-tale-of-two-states/301750441/ [https://perma.cc/SST5-4VR2]. 
176 Mark Boswell, Climate Change Threatens our Forests, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2019), 
http://www.startribune.com/climate-change-threatens-minnesota-s-forests/502090221/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RJC-6WXK] (“Because trees can be sensitive to average temperatures 
and rainfall, and because Minnesota contains the edges of several biomes where tree species 
are especially susceptible to change, Minnesota’s forest cover could change rapidly in coming 
decades.”).  
177 Nadja Popovich & Blacki Migliozzi, Where Are America’s Winters Warming the Most? 
In Cold Places, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/16/climate/us-winter-warming.html 
[https://perma.cc/P3DV-7YTU]. 
178 Id. 
179 TOM MYERS, DULUTH CLEAN WATER, RISK ANALYSIS OF PROBABLY MAXIMUM FLOOD 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE AT THE POLYMET FLOTATION TAILINGS BASIN 7-9 (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/587176b720099e63d3423b7a/t/5ac1a0b6575d1f2de6
6c7d23/1522639047697/Risk+Analysis+of+Probable+Maximum+Flood+and+Climate+Cha
nge+at+the+PolyMet+Flotation+Tailings+Basin.pdf [https://perma.cc/NE5K-3L9Z]; Kirsti 
Marohn, Northern Minn. Mine Breach Leaves Messy Cleanup, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/06/04/northern-minnesota-mine-
breach-leaves-messy-cleanup-damages [https://perma.cc/95GA-8YNT]. 
180 Climate & Health, MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/environment/climate/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/LD2R-YJNU].  
181 See ALLISON CRIMMINS ET AL., US GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, THE IMPACTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON HUMAN HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 
1 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.7930/J0R49NQX [https://perma.cc/2P5R-KBBB]. 
35
Kingston: Strictly Leakage: How Minnesota Export Subsidies Pay for Climate
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
   
2019] STRICTLY LEAKAGE  273 
danger of sea level rise.182 As Gina McCarthy, former head of the EPA, 
wrote, “climate change is not about some far off challenge in distant 
countries, or something that will only be felt by people in some far off time. 
It’s already posing direct and indirect threats to public health in the United 
States today.”183  
This includes algal blooms, worsening water quality, and 
desynchronization of ecosystems, all of which can lead to increased disease 
in human populations.184 The most vulnerable, including children, the 
elderly, and pregnant women, are harmed more by negative health impacts 
than the general populace.185 Indirect harms of increased heat include the 
production of dangerous air pollution, such as ground-level ozone, as well 
as the potential for degraded water quality leading to the spread of cholera 
or Legionnaires’ disease.186  
Climate change is also known to impact nutrition and cause food 
insecurity, particularly among Indigenous populations and those who rely 
more heavily on fish as a staple food.187 Shifts in growing patterns can 
eliminate culturally-appropriate foods188 and have a larger impact on people 
who rely on their ecosystem to provide necessary food.189 Food scarcity 
from climate change can aggravate other conflicts and cycles of violence that 
are directly harmful to public health.190 Climate change has been linked to 
 
182 Maya Earls, Climate Expert at CDC Poised to File Whistleblower Complaint Over 
Treatment, SCIENCE (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/08/climate-
expert-cdc-poised-file-whistleblower-complaint-over-treatment [https://perma.cc/7Q8V-
EGSV]. 
183 JUSTIN GUNDLACH, CLIMATE CHANGE, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW, at X (Michael 
Burger & Justin Grundlach eds., 1st ed. 2018). 
184 Id. at 34, 36, 277.  
185 Id. at 37.  
186 Id. at 175 (discussing a 2013 outbreak of legionellosis in Milwaukee attributable to climate 
change).  
187 Id. at 48; see also id. at 49 (“The effects of climate change on food security, nutrition, and 
related health outcomes are linked predictably to socioeconomic conditions and adaptive 
capacity of communities; thus, low-income communities will disproportionately suffer from 
both food insecurity and malnutrition.”).  
188 Id. at 280. Addressing systemic problems with our food systems and incorporating 
agroecology is considered a method to support Indigenous populations in mitigating such 
damage. Id. at 296. 
189 Id. at 282.  
190 For example, climate change is fueling food scarcity and violence in parts of Mali that 
were already experiencing violent conflict. Lyse Doucet, The Battle on the Frontline of 
Climate Change in Mali, BBC NEWS: THE REPORTERS (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/the-reporters-46921487 [https://perma.cc/7358-AS2S]. (“Mali is 
now lurching between droughts and floods. They are both lasting longer and inflicting a huge 
cost on crops and livestock. And that means farmers and nomadic herders, from different 
ethnic groups, are facing off over shrinking resources.”).  
36
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/8
274 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
the global “syndemic” of obesity and undernutrition that is spreading 
throughout the world.191 
These public health and environmental problems caused by climate 
change are driven by emissions, including significant emissions from the 
largest industrial and powerplant sources in Minnesota. Because the EITE 
statute cheapens electrical rates for plants that are some of the biggest 
sources of GHG emissions in the state, the EITE statute directly subsidizes 
both additional GHG emissions from powerplants serving these customers 
and from the customers’ operations themselves.192 
1. Emissions Attributable to the EITE Statute  
In mid-2017, Minnesota’s then-Governor Dayton joined other states 
concerned about climate change to affirm they were still “in” the Paris 
agreement.193 During his tenure, however, he furthered no legislation that 
would address GHG emissions, marking the one-year anniversary of his 
commitment by noting Minnesota’s partial compliance with the emissions 
goals of a 2007 law passed by his predecessor.194 Nonetheless, he did sign 
at least one climate-change-relevant piece of legislation: the EITE statute.195 
Instead of demonstrating “we’re still in” the Paris Agreement to reduce 
GHG emissions, in the past few years the state began subsidizing 
overproduction at Minnesota EITE facilities. This has increased GHG 
emissions. 
 
191 The Global Syndemic of Obesity, Undernutrition, and Climate Change: The Lancet 
Commission Report, THE LANCET (Jan. 27, 2019), 
https://www.thelancet.com/commissions/global-syndemic [https://perma.cc/BA3F-YW7V]. 
192 See generally Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
[https://perma.cc/F99G-4PC7] (describing both direct and indirect GHG emissions from 
industry sector emissions). 
193 Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota Signs on to States’ Version of Paris Accord, STAR TRIB. 
(June 6, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-signs-on-to-states-version-of-paris-
accord/426598641/ [https://perma.cc/YJ3L-VEMD]. 
194 Press Release, U.S. Climate Alliance, Seventeen Governors in U.S. Climate Alliance 
Mark One-Year Anniversary with New Wave of Climate Actions (June 1, 2018) 
https://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications/oneyearanniversary [https://perma.cc/78YN-
33S3] (discussing the success of meeting the 25 percent renewable goal set out in the 2007 
Next Generation Energy Act); see MINN. STAT. § 216C.05, subdiv. 2(2) (2007); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 216C.05, subdiv. 2(2) (2018). 
195 tsuperadmin, Final Legislation Passed in Special Session, WORKDAY MINN. (June 15, 
2015) https://www.workdayminnesota.org/final-legislation-passed-in-special-session/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z96H-FFRX] (“Minnesota lawmakers avoided a partial government 
shutdown by passing several spending bills early on Saturday. Governor Mark Dayton 
promptly signed them . . . . The most controversial piece of legislation—the omnibus 
environment, natural resources and agriculture policy and finance bill—caused the most 
difficulty but was ultimately passed with the language agreed to by Dayton and the legislative 
leaders before the session was called.”). 
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2. Minnesota Iron’s GHG emissions 
The discussion in this section focuses on the emissions from iron 
mining and processing—some of the biggest direct sources of emissions from 
the EITE rate.196 In the iron and steel industry, “[e]nergy use and emissions 
depend on the production methods employed. Increased coordination in 
the industry could ensure the application of more efficient technologies and 
the development of next generation technologies with the greatest [climate 
change] mitigation potential.”197 GHG emissions from the industry arise 
from the electrical generation used (indirect emissions), the burning of fossil 
fuels on-site (direct), and the use of coal and lime in the chemical processing 
(direct).
198
 Steel and iron manufacturing are responsible for around 7 to 9% 
of global CO2 emissions.199  
Minnesota’s policy drags down climate change progress. Since 1990, 
industrial sources of GHG emissions (including only direct emissions from 
EITE customers and not their indirect electrical or transportation 
emissions,200 which are counted separately in statewide figures) have 
increased by more than five million tons of CO2 equivalent in Minnesota.201 
This historic trend of increasing GHG emissions is now economically 
bolstered by the EITE subsidy. EPA data from 2015–17 shows that GHG 
 
196 Iron processing plants are likely the largest sources of indirect emissions from powerplants 
owing to these utility customers’ huge electricity demands. But since these companies are 
entitled to protect their trade secrets, each facility’s relative electrical demand is not likely to 
be a public record. See MINN. STAT. § 13.37, subdiv. 1(b) (2019). 
197 See TURNER supra note 28. 
198 See id. 
199 WORLD STEEL ASS’N, STEEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO A LOW CARBON FUTURE AND 
CLIMATE RESILIENT SOCIETIES – WORLD STEEL POSITION PAPER (2019), 
https://www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:7ec64bc1-c51c-439b-84b8-
94496686b8c6/Position_paper_climate_2019_vfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW3N-3XB4]. 
Estimates regarding the industry’s total emissions vary over time but seem to hover between 
five and ten percent of global emissions. For example, in 2007 the IEA estimated the iron 
and steel sector produced 5.2 percent of global GHG emissions. See BARON ET AL., supra 
note 13. In 2000, IEA placed it at 7 percent. However, if mining and transportation are 
included, the industry is likely responsible for 10 percent of global emissions. See DE BEER 
ET AL. supra note 32, at 2; see also Why More Buildings Should be Made of Wood, THE 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/01/05/why-more-
buildings-should-be-made-of-wood, [https://perma.cc/Z2UL-9S7J] (“Cement-making alone 
produces 6% of the world’s carbon emissions. Steel, half of which goes into buildings, 
accounts for another 8%.”). 
200 See generally Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
[https://perma.cc/F99G-4PC7] (describing direct and indirect GHG emissions by industry 
sector). 
201 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/greenhouse-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/A7R6-
VBM3] (select “Interactive Sector Details” from the data sets, then select “Industrial” in 
“Choose a sector”). 
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emissions from the largest facility getting an EITE subsidy have been 
growing year-on-year—U.S. Steel’s Minntac facility reportedly emitted 1.071 
million metric tons of CO2 in 2015, growing to 1.181 million metric tons in 
2016 and 1.396 million metric tons in 2017,
202
 when the EITE rate came 
into effect. Although the facility’s GHG emissions were already increasing 
prior to the EITE rate subsidy, according to the company’s position before 
the PUC this rate was a significant boon to their business going forward.203 
Northshore Mining is also among the top ten emitters, another iron 
processing facility and beneficiary of the EITE rate.
204
 To put the increasing 
emissions from these mining and processing plant in context, Minnesota 
facilities with more GHG emissions than Minntac only include a few large 
power plants plus the state’s largest oil refinery.205  
The Keetac mine, Minntac’s little sibling in the U.S. Steel family, is 
another illustrative example. According to EPA annual GHG reporting 
numbers, Keetac had a comparatively meager 188,934 tons of carbon 
emissions in 2017,
206
 making it one-seventh the size of Minntac’s emissions 
that year. As the EPA notes, however, its “data set does not reflect total U.S. 
GHG emissions.”207 A 2010 environmental review that the Minnesota DNR 
approved for Keetac (a “Final Environmental Impact Statement” or FEIS) 
lists the many additional GHG emissions attributable to the project that are 
 
202 2017 Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large Facilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
[https://perma.cc/M9RJ-ZK7J] (select 2018 for “Data Year,” Minnesota for “Browse to a 
State,” and View by Facility; facility is US STEEL–Minntac). 
203 See September 2016 PUC Agenda Meeting supra note 136, at 48:00 (discussing U.S. 
Steel’s testimony before the PUC).  
204 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 202. 
205 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 202. Moreover, of the three power plants with 
larger emissions than Minntac, the largest coal plant is scheduled for retirement in 2026 and 
the second largest (which also recently took offline its smallest coal units at the end of 2018) 
provides carbon-intensive electricity to Minntac. See Aaron Larson, Xcel to Retire Two 
Units at Its Largest Coal-Fired Plant, POWER (Oct. 6, 2015), 
https://www.powermag.com/xcel-to-retire-two-units-at-its-largest-coal-fired-plant/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9CZ-MM5F]; Minnesota Power to Retire Boswell’s Smallest Two Coal 
Units, BUSINESS NORTH (Oct. 19, 2016), 
http://www.businessnorth.com/daily_briefing/minnesota-power-to-retire-boswell-s-smallest-
two-coal-units/article_26aaae40-962b-11e6-9ce1-cbbff842414f.html 
[https://perma.cc/YH5E-XBRN]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 202. Minntac 
pulls electricity from Minnesota Power’s Boswell powerplant. Boswell Energy Center’s 
reported 2017 GHG emissions were 7,768,990 metric tons of CO2. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, supra note 202. While the state’s other large GHG sources, namely Xcel’s coal-
burning power plants and the state’s refineries, can be projected to decrease their GHG 
emissions as fossil fuel use decreases in energy and transportation, for the foreseeable future 
the EITE rate incentivizes Minntac to increase its indirect GHG emissions by subsidizing its 
use of additional energy production from a coal powerplant with no set retirement date. See 
BUSINESS NORTH, supra note 205 (discussing the continued operations of Units three and 
four, the larger coal generating units at the plant). 
206 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 202. 
207 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 202. 
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not reflected in EPA’s yearly total and provides a fuller view of how much 
total pollution these types of facilities can emit.208 While these estimates are 
nearly a decade old, they serve to put the direct emissions EPA tracks in the 
larger context. 
Keetac and other Minnesota mines burn a large amount of fuel to bake 
the materials into their finished product—taconite pellets that can be moved 
to other states for further processing.209 Keetac’s 2010 upgrade allowed for 
its burner to run on coal, natural gas, fuel oil, or biomass.
210
 The FEIS 
estimated that Keetac’s direct combustion emissions would be 118,000 tons 
per year burning only coal (which would go down to 33,000 tons per year 
burning 50 percent biomass and 50 percent natural gas, and that for each 
fuel scenario other fixed physical or chemical GHG emissions would be 
71,000 tons per year).
211
 According to the FEIS, if Keetac were at full 
operation and burning only coal, its total direct emissions would be about 
189,000 tons,212 almost exactly what the EPA data reported its emissions 
had been in 2017. Coal, Keetac’s apparent fuel choice, produces the highest 
emissions of any of the possible fuel types, showing that even accounting for 
other related factors, the most recent data show Keetac is running at the 
worst possible GHG maximum-production output contemplated by its 
FEIS.
213
  
Those numbers, however, are just the tip of a carbon iceberg. At full 
operation, the mine also has significant additional emissions from the 
following: mobile sources such as the excavating machines and trucks that 
 
208 The FEIS lists the limited number of GHG emissions sources reported to the EPA as: 
carbon dioxide emissions from the many furnaces and coke combustion used in processing 
taconite into ore; methane and nitrous oxide emissions from fuel combustion including the 
same furnaces, additional furnaces, boilers, and other combustion sources; carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide emissions from flares per EPA standards for petroleum 
refineries; and default “emissions factors for coke oven gas and blast furnace gas.” MINN. 
DEP’T OF NAT. RES., U.S. STEEL KEETAC TACONITE MINE EXPANSION PROJECT: FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 5–27 (2010) 
https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/input/environmentalreview/keetac/final_eis/keetac_mine_expa
nion_feis.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2XW-FXGF] [hereinafter KEETAC FEIS]. The FEIS then 
went on to present a much more comprehensive estimate of its overall GHG emissions than 
is available in the EPA yearly reporting data—which adds up to magnitudes-bigger GHG 
impacts of this “small” taconite processing plant. An environmental review often has a wealth 
of information on how a facility operates and pollutes, and the Keetac FEIS is no exception. 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 74–76. Minnesota facilities only produce iron pellets 
that must be shipped to other states to become higher-value finished products. These pellets 
may only be used by a few facilities in the country, owned by a select few large steelmaking 
companies.  
210 See KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32. 
211 See KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32. 
212 KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32 (adding totals from “Stationary Combustion” and 
“Fixed Physical or Chemical Process” rows of Table 3.3.7). 
213  KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32. 
40
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/8
278 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
haul ore to the plant (51,000 tons per year); land use changes (33,500 tons 
per year); electricity purchases (570,000 tons per year); product shipping 
(412,000 tons per year); and fuel shipping (which varies by fuel type between 
9,000 and 1,000 tons per year, 6000 tons for coal).
214
 Therefore, if Keetac 
runs at full capacity burning coal—as EPA data suggests it did in 2017—its 
overall emissions from related activities that are required to keep it in 
operation are likely 1,261,500 tons,
215
 nearly seven times the EPA-reported 
emissions the plant emits directly. 
Keetac is not an outlier among Minnesota iron mining and processing 
facilities in the way its electrical consumption and taconite pellet shipping 
dwarfs its already-significant reported emissions of GHG pollution. Both 
Minntac and Northshore Mining make pellets similar to Keetac’s216 sending 
them on the same supply chain to be milled into steel elsewhere.217 While 
supply chain end points and plant specifics are different, Minnesota facilities 
profiting from the EITE rate likely have emissions many times larger than 
their reported direct emissions when comparable indirect lifecycle 
emissions are considered.
218
  
3. Other EITE-linked GHG Emissions 
This outsized lifecycle GHG impact of the EITE rate is also not 
limited to the iron mining and processing industry. Another beneficiary of 
the EITE rate is oil pipeline pump stations. The EPA-reported emissions 
 
214 KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32; see also Air Emissions Modeling: Biogenic 
Emission Sources, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/air-emissions-
modeling/biogenic-emission-sources [https://perma.cc/L8ZF-VL8U]. 
215 KEETAC FEIS, supra note 208, at 3–32.  
216 Northshore has recently upgraded part of its facility to produce a different type of iron 
pellets for steel mills in other states. Kraker, supra note 76. The indirect emissions associated 
with producing these pellets might be different than traditional taconite pellet processing, but 
the transportation related emissions still likely render total emissions significantly higher than 
if the plants produced steel onsite or invested in efficient processes.  
217 See Northshore Mining, HEART OF THE NORTHSHORE, 
http://heartofthenorthshore.com/business/listings.php?id=108 [https://perma.cc/8Q94-
U993] (“Northshore has the capacity to produce and ship about six million [tons of] iron ore 
pellets annually from its harbor on Lake Superior.”). 
218 Looking further down the GHG lifecycle emissions chain, over 9 million tons of all 73 
million tons of GHGs from the industry in 2017 came from one U.S. Steel mill, the Gary 
Works (which is near Arcelor Mittal’s Indiana mill that produced over 10 million tons of 
GHG emissions in the same year). See GHGRP, supra note 28 (data available in map). U.S. 
Steel’s Great Lakes Works also emitted four million tons of GHG according to the same 
data set, providing yet another example of a large emissions source that relies on taconite 
pellets from Minntac and Keetac. See GHGRP, supra note 28. These steelmaking emissions 
using taconite produced in Minnesota are apparently not included in the FEIS estimates that 
were provided for total project emissions at Keetac. In other words, in addition to Keetac’s 
direct emissions and larger emissions from both electrical usage and transportation of 
product to faraway steel mills, the linked and necessary next step of converting Keetac’s 
pellets into usable product is itself another additional large source of GHG emissions.    
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for these stations are an infinitesimal fraction of the total emissions they 
facilitate. The direct emissions (mostly from leaks at the facilities, also 
known as “fugitive emissions”) from a new pipeline’s pump stations are 
around 372.2 tons per year,
219
 but that same pipeline’s deforestation effect 
(just in the state of Minnesota) is 1,262 tons of carbon sequestration lost,
220
 
and emissions from electricity used are 497,112 tons of CO2 equivalent per 
year.
221
 But all of those emissions are dwarfed by the potential emissions 
from the product that is transported, both from its production in Alberta’s 
tar sands region and when it is used (i.e., made into products or burned as 
fuel), a yearly emissions increase of 193 million ton CO2e.
222
 Over the life of 
the project it is forecast to produce enough GHGs to cause 287 billion 
dollars’ worth of climate change damage globally.223 
4. Preventable Inefficient GHG Emissions 
It is significant here that the EITE beneficiary facilities are exempt 
from Minnesota’s efficiency-promoting legal standards. In 2008, Minntac 
upgraded its burners to more efficient natural gas systems, producing a 
significant decrease in natural gas consumption and a large savings for the 
company.
224
 Despite making economic sense and benefiting the company, 
while lessening the burden on the environment, U.S. Steel reportedly only 
made the upgrade because federal regulation came into effect and required 
the replacement of outdated polluting technology.
225
 Therefore, efficiency 
 
219 MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ENERGY ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS: FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT LINE 3 PROJECT 5-459 tbl. 5.2.7-8 (2018), 
https://mn.gov/eera/web/project-
file?legacyPath=/opt/documents/34079/Line%203%20Revised%20FEIS%20Ch%2005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7Z5-DYMF]. 
220 Id. at 5-460. 
221 Id. at 5-461. 
222 Id. at 5-465 to 466 tbl. 5.2.7-12.  
223 See supra note 115. The dollar amount provided is only the current value of damage. By 
the time the project occurs the compounded interest of the damage will most likely exceed 
a trillion dollars. 
224 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LARGEST PRODUCER OF STEEL PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES ACHIEVES SIGNIFICANT ENERGY SAVINGS AT ITS MINNTAC PLANT 1 (2008), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/US_steel_case_study.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M49K-CMP7] (“The new burners are yielding annual cost and energy 
savings of $760,000 and 95,000 MMBtu respectively. Additionally, the plant saves $30,000 
in annual maintenance labor costs. With project costs of approximately $1.2 million, the 
plant achieved a simple payback of 1.5 years.”). 
225 Federal regulators intervened after the state failed to do so. See WOOD MACKENZIE, 
ASSET REPORT: MINNTAC IRON ORE MINE (2019) 
https://www.woodmac.com/reports/metals-minntac-iron-ore-mine-16564337 
[https://perma.cc/DD35-95YV] (“This came after the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) published a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) establishing emission limits and the 
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was opposed by the company until regulators forced an upgrade that made 
environmental (and economic) sense, required by law.226 This failure to act 
until regulators commanded it suggests that Minntac and its EITE-rate 
cohort have been insufficiently incentivized by energy prices to implement 
efficient upgrades, even prior to the EITE subsidy coming into effect.  
V. EITE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Since EITE only applies to businesses that are “Trade Exposed,” this 
article now turns to the larger trade issues surrounding EITE’s largest 
beneficiaries. While EITE is hardly the only distorting policy that benefits 
Minnesota’s iron industry, it is a state-sponsored economic boost that is 
inconsistent with the U.S.’s normal trade position. This might have 
consequences for Minnesota if foreign nations successfully use the EITE 
statute as ammunition in a trade war.  
A. National Policies Protecting the American Iron and Steel Industry 
The iron and steel industry was at the center of the IEA analysis of 
sectoral approaches and was also at the center of Minnesota’s EITE rate—
multinational iron companies are a major beneficiary of EITE. Minnesota’s 
subsidy of the industry comes at a time when national and international steel 
imports and exports have been in the news, largely owing to the president’s 
focus on steel227 and imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum imports,228 
 
use of low NOx reduction technology on indurating furnaces located in Minnesota.”); 
Minnesota’s Regional Haze State Implementation Plan, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL 
AGENCY, https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/minnesotas-regional-haze-state-implementation-
plan [https://perma.cc/P8SX-YDSU] (“EPA partially disapproved Minnesota’s SIP and 
these requirements have not yet been finalized. EPA agreed with Minnesota’s determination 
of which sources were subject to BART and that BART for PM emissions from these sources 
was satisfied by the requirements of the Taconite MACT. However, EPA disapproved the 
proposed NOX and SO2 limits contained in Minnesota’s SIP, stating that the proposed 
determinations did not go far enough in controlling NOX and SO2 emissions. As a result, 
EPA developed a federal implementation plan (FIP) to address the deficiencies in the 
Minnesota SIP.”). 
226 See generally sources cited supra note 225.   
227 See Manuela Tobias, No, U.S. Steel Is Not Opening Six New Mills as Donald Trump 
Said, POLITIFACT (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2018/aug/02/donald-trump/us-steel-not-opening-six-new-mills-donald-
trump/ [https://perma.cc/596X-SXNL]; see also Keith Bradsher, When Solar Panels 
Became Job Killers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/business/china-trade-solar-panels.html 
[https://perma.cc/PFY7-VELJ]. 
228 This article does not address aluminum industry emissions because there is no aluminum 
production of note in Minnesota. It also appears that steel is more troublesome for the 
climate than aluminum, at least within American emissions. EPA’s 2017 data showed the 
iron and steel industries emitted 82 percent of all measured GHG emissions from the metals 
sector, 72,609,302 tons of CO2e, while aluminum production emitted only 3.7 percent of the 
total emissions from the sector. See GHGRP, supra note 28 (hover over pie chart for figure). 
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among other things.229 Hence, because of the iron industry’s centrality to all 
these forces, this paper focuses on that industry rather than other 
beneficiaries of the EITE tariff.230 
While Minnesota is subsidizing this industry, it is important to avoid 
calling the kettle black. National subsidies of iron and steel are not 
uncommon, and the current state of international trade is a result of many 
countries’ interest in keeping iron and steel production viable domestically. 
The low prices of steel since 2014 are widely attributed to Chinese 
production increases that were suddenly let loose on the global market when 
the country reduced its own steel consumption, instead exporting it.
231
 
Government protectionism has led to global market doldrums, since no 
country was willing to cut back on its capacity to make steel:  
[B]ecause steel is often seen as a strategic industry, providing lots 
of jobs in areas where there are few other employers, 
governments are usually keen on propping them up, either 
through subsidies or nationalisation. China has overproduced 
steel for so long because regional Communist Party officials, who 
control local steel plants, prefer to subsidise their local plants to 
keep them open rather than risk the unemployment and unrest 
that may follow shuttering them. In Europe, Italy has spent €2 
billion to support the Ilva steel mill in Taranto. And even in 
Britain, where nationalisation has long been out of favour, the 
Conservative government has expressed a willingness to take a 
25% stake in the Port Talbot steelworks.
232
 
While some state support for iron and steel is typical, it also causes low 
prices,233 making it harder for companies to invest in more efficient 
production. By keeping prices low enough to avoid new market innovations, 
compounded with subsidies for the large existing companies to stay open, 
the overall incentive is to maintain the status quo rather than accelerate 
innovation that would likely also reduce pollution externalities.
234
 Therefore, 
 
229 See, e.g., Richard Gonzales, Trump Slaps Tariffs on Imported Solar Panels and Washing 
Machines, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/01/22/579848409/trump-slaps-tariffs-on-imported-solar-panels-and-washing-
machines [https://perma.cc/E4PC-F2JZ]. 
230 A full analysis of each of the industries receiving EITE subsidies could be interesting, but 
a more appropriate subject for a book than an article. 
231 C.R., Why the World Has Too Much Steel, THE ECONOMIST (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/05/05/why-the-world-has-too-
much-steel [https://perma.cc/3QM3-RH7F]. 
232 Id.  
233 Id. 
234 “But until countries stop subsidizing their plants, or imposing tariffs to artificially raise 
prices, progress towards ending the steel glut will be slow.” Id. 
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it seems likely that Minnesota’s EITE statute is a standout example of 
something going on in more than one country.235 
1. U.S. Protectionism Against Imports 
In recent years, the Trump Administration has taken new protectionist 
positions, exposing the U.S. to uncommon reprisal risks. In January 2018, 
the U.S. Commerce Department delivered an analysis that updated the 
government’s view of steel tariffs in light of the current market.236 The 
report suggested “a global tariff of 24 percent on imports of steel articles in 
order to reduce imports to a level that the Secretary assessed would enable 
domestic steel producers to use approximately 80 percent of existing 
domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic 
viability through increased production.”237 By March 2018, President 
Trump opted to set the steel tariff at 25 percent.238 The President’s written 
decision also noted a “shared concern about global excess capacity, a 
circumstance that is contributing to the threatened impairment of the 
national security” and offered to discuss alternative measures with allies.239 
Providing the main legal justification for the action, his official statement 
said: “It is my judgment that the tariff imposed by this proclamation is 
necessary and appropriate to adjust imports of steel articles so that such 
imports will not threaten to impair the national security as defined in section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended.”240 The United 
States currently uses national security (measured by domestic industry 
success) as its stated reason for making steel imports more costly for 
American buyers.241 Tariffs on imports, paid by American businesses and 
consumers, are meant to prop up domestic production in order to “achieve 
long-term economic viability,”242 which would ostensibly be good for 
national security.  
The 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs and the resulting trade dispute 
are different from other disputes between the U.S. and steel exporting 
countries in the past. Classic trade disputes usually follow a simple formula: 
“One country would build up an industry to create jobs, and then dump 
 
235 See infra note 255 (The Trump Administration recently accused several trading partners 
of similar supports of their steel industries).  
236 Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018) (“[T]he Secretary considered 
the previous U.S. Government measures and actions on steel articles imports and excess 
capacity, including actions taken under Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and 
George W. Bush.”). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 11,626. Importers could apply to the Department of Commerce to have their steel 
excepted if it could not be obtained from a domestic source. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 11,627. 
241 Id. at 11,625. 
242 Id. 
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excess products in another country at below-cost prices. Competitors facing 
unrealistically cheap imports would file ‘anti-dumping’ complaints to seek 
government-backed protections.”243 Following that model, in 2016 the U.S. 
Steel Corporation filed a complaint with the U.S. government—this time 
against subsidized production regulation in China’s steel industry.244 The 
U.S. government responded that same year by imposing measures to deal 
with steel dumping.245 Within that dispute, the Obama administration met 
with other steel producing countries and attempted to negotiate an 
agreement to cut global steel production capacity.246 In contrast to the 
regular playbook—with the normal emphasis on open but fair trade—the 
Trump administration initiated its campaign by partly closing off the U.S. 
market to this globally-traded commodity on National Defense grounds.247 
The action was unilateral and caused numerous foreseeable responses that 
likely could have been avoided through more multilateral or targeted 
measures.  
While the effects of the 2018 tariffs on overall trade will take time to 
assess, there is some indication they are having an economic impact. A U.S. 
Commerce Department analysis using data from June 2019 shows that the 
year-to-date imports of steel falling by 14 percent from 2018.248 The United 
States is the world’s largest steel importer, and steel imports make up 1.2 
percent of all U.S. imports.249 But even with the support of tariffs, domestic 
industry has a lot of catching up to do to meet U.S. demand: “Production 
in 2018 grew from 81.6 mmt in 2017 to 86.6 in 2018. Production further 
 
243 Marilyn Geewax, U.S. Steel Says China Is Using Cyber Stealth to Steal its Secrets, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO: THE TWO-WAY (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/29/476070445/u-s-steel-says-china-is-using-cyber-stealth-to-steal-its-secrets 
[https://perma.cc/F49C-ERC3]. The U.S. steel industry pushed for similar protections in 
1978 when it convinced the U.S. government to take action against the dumping of Japanese 
steel pipe. Id. 
244 Id. At that time, U.S. Steel also asserted that the Chinese industry stole trade secrets 
regarding production of high value “advanced steel products.” Id. 
245 Id. In April 2018, USITC decided to terminate their investigation in its entirety. Certain 
Carbon and Alloy Steel Products, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,127 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
246 Id. 
247 Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,625–30 (Mar. 15, 
2018). 
248 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. COMM., supra note 10, at 1. This could be due to 
fluctuations based on global market forces. Id. at 2 (“In 2014, U.S. imports of steel products 
reached a near-record high of 40.3 million metric tons, only topped by the 41.3 million 
metric tons imported in 2006. Import levels fell from 2014 by 12 percent in 2015, and then 
by 15 percent in 2016, before rising 15 percent in 2017 to 34.5 million metric tons.”). This 
may be due in part to the many antidumping and countervailing measures the U.S. had 
implemented against steel-exporting countries prior to the president’s across-the-board 
tariffs. Id. at 7 (indicating 30 trade remedies against Chinese steel, 22 against South Korea, 
17 against India, 13 against Japan, and 8 against Brazil in effect). 
249 INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. COMM., supra note 10, at 1.  
46
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/8
284 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
increased 5.2 percent from 42.1 mmt in YTD 2018 to 44.3 mmt in YTD 
2019. Since 2009, apparent consumption (a measure of steel demand) has 
consistently exceeded production.”250 
U.S. domestic production is controlled by a small group of domestic 
and foreign-owned companies, and the largest three companies—Nucor, 
Arcelor Mittal, and U.S. Steel—“accounted for the majority of U.S. crude 
steel production in 2018.”251 
2. Increasing Trade Conflicts and Repercussions 
In addition to the 2018 tariffs, the U.S. Commerce Department 
recently announced a new investigation into the iron and steel industries of 
Canada, Mexico, and China.252 These countries have been accused of 
supporting their industries with “unfair subsidies,” including: 
44 subsidy programs alleged for Canada, including tax programs, 
grant programs, loan programs, export insurance programs, and 
equity programs . . . 26 subsidy programs alleged for China, 
including tax programs, grant programs, debt restructuring 
programs, export subsidy programs, as well as the provision of 
goods and services for less than adequate remuneration . . . 19 
subsidy programs alleged for Mexico, including grant programs, 
tax programs, export programs, and loan programs.253 
The announcement paints this action as part of the Trump 
administration’s emphasis on antidumping and countervailing duties 
investigations.254 This emphasis has won the United States no friends 
among countries who have been investigated and retaliated against, 
prompting the countries to bring claims against the U.S. actions in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution system.255 
Outside of the WTO’s formal system, countries are responding to the 
tariffs in various ways. Following the imposition of U.S. tariffs imposed on 
 
250 Id. at 6. 
251 Id.  
252 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates 
Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Imports of Fabricated 
Structural Steel from Canada, China, and Mexico (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/02/us-department-commerce-initiates-
antidumping-duty-and-countervailing [https://perma.cc/5393-3JUA] [hereinafter Press 
Release, U.S. D.O.C. Issues Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations]. 
253 Id. 
254 Illustrated by 143 new investigations by February 2019, a 249 percent increase over the 
Obama administration’s number of investigations in the comparable time period. Id. This is 
similar to the press release the agency made when announcing a similar investigation of 
Spanish olives, indicating the overall push on trade sanctions is neither limited to a small 
number of countries, nor a short list of goods. Zoe Thomas, Olives Pitting US Against EU 
in Global Trade Fight, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-
47287036 [https://perma.cc/BK7D-UB2V]. 
255 Press Release, U.S. D.O.C. Issues Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations, supra 
note 252. 
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the bulk of goods imported from China, the Chinese government has 
responded with retributive tariffs on U.S. cars, soybeans, and whiskey,256 
while also reaching out to Iowa voters.257 Both Canada and the EU 
commenced WTO actions against the United States258 with the EU even 
imposing countervailing tariffs on U.S. goods.259 Whether responses from 
trading partners and competitors sound in formal proceedings or outside of 
them, and as the U.S. likely continues to ratchet up its investigation of 
imports and impose adverse trade remedies, the reaction by other countries 
will increase in kind.260  
As tensions escalate and other countries try an “all of the above” 
strategy to deal with U.S. trade measures, it matters whether the U.S. 
position is legally unsound or indefensible. It is EITE statutes that may give 
these other countries a tool to undermine the United States’ overall anti-
foreign-subsidy free trade arguments at the WTO. 
 
256 Bill Chappell, China’s $50 Billion Tariff Threat Targets U.S. Soybeans, Cars, Whiskey, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO: THE TWO-WAY (Apr. 4, 2018, 11:21 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/04/599391926/chinas-50-billion-tariff-
threat-targets-u-s-soybeans-cars-whiskey [https://perma.cc/L7KS-2SJY]. 
257 Mark Niquette & Jennifer Jacobs, China Looks to Influence Iowa in Trade War Over 
Trump Tariffs, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2018, 4:46 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-23/china-looks-to-influence-iowa-in-
trade-war-over-trump-tariffs [https://perma.cc/U4MU-9MDY]. In the latter half of 2018, the 
Chinese government started taking out ads in the Des Moines Register, explaining that 
Donald Trump’s actions cause Chinese consumers to purchase soybeans from other 
countries. Id. Iowa is heavily reliant on agricultural exports and marks the jumping off point 
for U.S. presidential contests every four years. Thus, this was a signal of how international 
political pressure might interact with an already politicized trade war. 
258 See Panel Communication, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/16 (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds548_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S5UX-M3WN] (for EU); Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures 
on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS550/R (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds550_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/V5DT-A7E9] (noting on June 1, 2018 Canada requested consultations 
with the U.S. on certain measures imposed against their steel and aluminum products. This 
dispute was settled on May 23, 2019). 
259 European Commission Press Release IP/18/4220, EU Adopts Rebalancing Measures in 
Reaction to U.S. Steel and Aluminium Tariffs (June 20, 2018), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-18-4220_en.htm [https://perma.cc/4FQF-LLGP]. 
260 While China and the U.S.’s tit-for-tat tariff skirmish is a clear example, other trade 
partners have responded similarly to U.S. actions. See, e.g., Avie Schneider, Trump 
Announces Higher Tariffs on Goods from China After Dow Plunges 623 Points, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 23, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/23/753676591/trade-
war-heats-up-again-as-china-sets-tariffs-on-75-billion-in-u-s-goods-autos 
[https://perma.cc/LR4D-9GDC] (“President Trump on Friday announced higher tariffs on 
goods from China, hours after Beijing said it will slap tariffs on $75 billion of autos and other 
U.S. goods.”). 
48
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/8
286 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
B. Trade Law and Minnesota’s EITE 
The U.S. is a party to a large number of trade agreements, many of 
which are multilateral agreements created under the auspices of the WTO 
and at the behest of the U.S., a longtime champion of liberalized 
international trade.261 The WTO is a venue where countries negotiate new 
trade agreements, discuss issues of international trade, foster relationships 
and cooperation, and arbitrate possible violations of the treaties it 
oversees.262  
Given recent disputes before the WTO, it seems likely that 
Minnesota’s EITE subsidy is a violation of our international trade 
commitments. Such a violation, if found by the WTO’s dispute resolution 
panel,263 would undercut the Unites States’ overall position against China 
and other trading partners on its steel, and other tariffs. The justifications 
for the Trump Administration’s protectionist tariffs and planned trade 
remedies (premised on unfair subsidies in other countries) is undercut by 
the EITE statute’s similar subsidy, and other countries might be entitled to 
enact countervailing measures—essentially large financial penalties against 
the U.S. that offset the wrong done to them under trade law.264  
 
261 The U.S.’s push for peace and security drove the creation of today’s global trade system. 
The agreements that set in motion the current multilateralism at the WTO were a reaction 
to the Second World War. The Atlantic Charter was agreed upon by Winston Churchill 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt at a critical moment as the U.S. considered entering the war. 
Comprised of eight succinct clauses, the Charter sets out “common principles” on which 
both countries based their “hopes for a better future for the world.” Hunter Nottage, Trade 
in War’s Darkest Hour: Churchill and Roosevelt’s Daring 1941 Atlantic Meeting that Linked 
Global Economic Cooperation to Lasting Peace and Security, WTO 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/tradewardarkhour41_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/24EK-FMYV]. The U.S. has been a member of the GATT, the WTO’s 
predecessor, since January 1, 1948. United States of America and the WTO, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Q8L7-
3L84]. 
262 Who We Are, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [https://perma.cc/935V-
6Y2N]. 
263 This is the first adjudication level for WTO disputes. Panel decisions can also be 
appealed to the Appellate Body, the “court” of last resort. See the Process—Stages in a 
Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S2ZX-5XMJ]. 
264 For a recent example, see the U.S.’s proposed countervailing duties against European 
wine and cheese in retaliation for the EU’s subsidization of Airbus, a WTO-confirmed trade 
violation. Initiation of Investigation; Notice of Hearing and Request for Public Comments: 
Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,028, 
15,036, (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Preliminary_Product_List.
pdf [https://perma.cc/M7ZL-NM8V]. 
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Trade dispute outcomes are difficult to predict because there are often 
valid contrasting views of the standards set out in any trade agreement.265 It 
is also true that WTO “precedent” is not precedent in the way that common 
law court cases determine the law for future courts.
266
 Past decisions by the 
WTO “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, 
therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.”267 However, because the WTO agreements include a requirement 
that the dispute resolution system provide “security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system,”268 WTO panels do follow legal interpretations 
established by the WTO Appellate Body.269 This is all to say, examples of 
past WTO decisions discussed below are illustrative of how a violation 
might be found, but not necessarily controlling in the way a common-law 
judicial decision would be. 
 
265 “The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a 
wide range of activities.” What We Stand For, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L378-6WXW]. A cursory reading of any Appellate Body opinion—laying 
out countries’ diametrically opposed but plausible readings of WTO covered agreements—
indicates how hard it can be to predict the legal outcomes of WTO disputes. See, e.g., 
Appellate Body Report, China— Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/14 (adopted Sept. 2, 2014), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=126459&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHa
sh=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True 
[https://perma.cc/VA7C-ZZNJ]. 
266 A WTO panel can follow reasoning it approves of, but not even the parties are bound by 
the decision of a WTO panel in a subsequent case on different facts. Legal Effect of Panel 
and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and Rulings, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9MAB-KDTJ]. There is considerable scholarly coverage concerning 
precedent at the WTO and this article does not attempt to address the issue, instead taking 
the WTO website at its word. 
267 Id. 
268 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1896 U.N.T.S. 
401, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu-e.html#3 [https://perma.cc/2CA7-
WWL5]. 
269 WTO Analytical Index, DSU–Article 3 (Jurisprudence), WTO, at 5–6, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/dsu_art3_jur.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MFJ4-MW7U] (quoting Panel Report, United States - Countervailing 
Measures on Certain Pipe and Tube Products (Turkey), ¶ 7.285, WTO Doc. WT/DS523/R 
(Dec. 8, 2018)) (rejecting “the United States’ argument that Turkey, the complainant, could 
not establish a prima facie case on the basis of the Appellate Body’s interpretation in a 
previous dispute”). 
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 1. WTO Prohibition on Subsidies of Goods for Export 
Broadly speaking, the U.S.’ WTO-covered trade agreements prohibit 
export subsidies other than for agricultural goods.270 This is confirmed U.S. 
policy even today under the Trump Administration, which is pushing back 
on other countries’ export subsidies271 in self-reportedly record-breaking 
fashion.272 
Among the WTO-covered agreements to which the U.S. is party is the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the “SCM 
Agreement”).273 The SCM Agreement restricts what government subsidies 
are allowed—forbidding government subsidies of goods that are exported to 
other countries—and describes how countries that are experiencing such 
subsidized imports can unilaterally impose “countervailing measures” to 
offset the violation.274 To be prohibited by the SCM Agreement, subsidies 
must be offered to an industry or group of industries275 and can include 
instances when the “government . . . directs a private body to carry out” a 
subsidy, which can include the transfer of funds, foregone collection of 
revenue, or provision of goods or services.276 Hence, a “subsidy” can be the 
gift of land from a local government or a favorable loan from a private bank 
in the right circumstances.277 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement defines two types of subsidies that 
are prohibited on all goods (other than agricultural goods).278 In Article 
3.1(a) the SCM Agreement prohibits all subsidies “contingent, in law or in 
 
270 Export Subsidies and Competition, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd08_export_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6TT3-9EXC] (“25 WTO members can subsidize exports, but only for 
products on which they have commitments to reduce the subsidies. Those without 
commitments cannot subsidize agricultural exports at all.”); What We Stand For, supra note 
265. 
271 See Kirtika Suneja, US Challenges India’s Export Subsidy Program at WTO, ECON. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-
trade/us-challenges-indias-export-subsidy-program-at-wto/articleshow/63306805.cms 
[https://perma.cc/8SF3-6DPY]. 
272 See Press Release, U.S. D.O.C. Issues Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations, 
supra note 252. 
273 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm [https://perma.cc/23FS-BHYY]. 
274 Id. (“Countervailing duties are a unilateral instrument, which may be applied by a 
Member after an investigation by that Member and a determination that the criteria set forth 
in the SCM Agreement are satisfied.”). 
275 Id. 
276 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1896 U.N.T.S. 229, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V5V-LP4T]. 
277 Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/global/09trade.html [https://perma.cc/JE7G-
VXNE]. 
278 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 276, art. 3 at 231. 
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fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export 
performance . . . .”279 To qualify, a subsidy does not explicitly have to be on 
exports, but at least must be “tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
export earnings.”280 China has been challenged by the EU for its alleged 
violation regarding exports of certain metals,281 a charge related to the export 
controls and other measures that the EU claimed China established.282 In 
contrast, the SCM Agreement’s Article 3.1(b) prohibits subsides that are 
contingent on using domestic over imported goods.283 Such subsidies are 
“de lege specific and thus easy to prosecute.”284 The EU and Japan have 
used this provision to fight a requirement by the Canadian province of 
Ontario that required utilities to purchase green energy produced from 
goods and services that were at least partly made or supplied in Ontario.285 
As will be seen below, a similar argument was also made against Minnesota’s 
solar incentive program “Made In Minnesota.”286 
Under the SCM Agreement, there has been a large amount of 
countervailing-duties action in recent years, with members of the agreement 
accusing other countries of illegal export or domestic-content subsidies. The 
EU brought WTO anti-dumping actions against Chinese subsidies of solar 
 
279 Id. 
280 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 276, art. 4, n.4 at 231. 
(“The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason 
alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.”). 
281 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union, China—Duties and 
Other Measures Concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS509/6 (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds509_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2QSG-VA3U]. 
282 Id. 
283 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 276, art. 3.1(b) at 231. 
284 Colares, supra note 48, at 442 (citing SCM Agreement, art 2.3). Different types of 
subsidies are held to different evidentiary standards. To fall within the highest prohibition 
(called simply “prohibited subsidies”), a subsidy must be specific—i.e. only available to an 
industry within a state—and distort trade by requiring domestic goods to be processed. Anti-
Dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc., WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm [https://perma.cc/2H9H-
AR99]. In a WTO dispute, such a prohibited subsidy is subject to accelerated procedure 
and, if found to exist must be “withdrawn immediately,” and is subject to the WTO’s harshest 
penalties—countervailing duties that allow the harmed country to take retributive action 
against the offending country’s exports. Id. The next disallowed subsidy is called an 
“actionable subsidy” and requires the complaining country to show certain types of damages 
in order to invalidate the subsidy. Id. Minnesota’s EITE statute and EITE rate seem to 
qualify as either a prohibited or actionable subsidy based on the available facts.  
285 Colares, supra note 48, at 442. 
286 See Mike Hughlett, Minnesota Solar Incentive Program Part of WTO Dispute with 
India, STAR TRIB. (Sep. 14, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-solar-incentive-
program-part-of-wto-dispute-with-india/393436411/ [https://perma.cc/RRK6-GUWV]. 
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panels for export.287 The U.S. has imposed countervailing duties on both 
Chinese solar panels and wind turbines after determining that these imports 
were being subsidized and dumped upon the U.S. market.288 Allies have 
now brought these trade measures against the U.S.’ recent steel and 
aluminum tariffs. The most salient example of this is the EU’s planned 
tariffs on American iconic brands such as Kentucky bourbon, Levi’s jeans, 
and Harley Davidson.
289
 As described above, the U.S. Commerce 
Department also announced it might impose such duties on steel imports 
to offset subsidies by Canada, Mexico, and China. In that announcement 
the agency confirms: 
Foreign companies that price their products in the U.S. market 
below the cost of production or below prices in their home 
markets are subject to antidumping duties. Companies that 
receive unfair subsidies from their governments, such as grants, 
loans, equity infusions, tax breaks, or production inputs, are 
subject to countervailing duties aimed at directly countering those 
subsidies.290 
The Trump Administration is not arguing that these trade rules and 
penalties do not apply to the domestic steel industry. Indeed, it relies on 
these tools for the bulk of its trade actions under the President’s focus on 
trade enforcement.291 
Regarding SCM Agreement Article 3.1(a), a recent WTO case 
initiated by the Trump Administration’s trade representative could 
contextualize what now counts as an export-performance subsidy.292 In 
 
287 Colares, supra note 48, at 443 (internal citation omitted); see also EU Launches Anti-
Dumping Investigation into Solar Panel Imports from China, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 
2012, 11:04 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9524933/EU-launches-
anti-dumping-investigation-into-solar-panel-imports-from-China.html 
[https://perma.cc/PS5F-RCQJ]. 
288 Keith Bradsher & Diane Cardwell, U.S. Slaps High Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/business/energy-
environment/us-slaps-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels.html [https://perma.cc/A9RS-DPGW].  
289 Richard Bravo, EU to Strike Back Against Trump with Levies on Harleys, Bourbon, 
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-31/eu-to-
strike-back-against-trump-with-levies-on-harley-s-bourbon [https://perma.cc/FA7F-YL3A]. 
290 Press Release, U.S. D.O.C. Issues Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations, supra 
note 252. 
291 See, e.g., id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Commerce, The Department of Commerce 
Amends Countervailing Duty Process (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/05/department-commerce-amends-
countervailing-duty-process [https://perma.cc/B34C-QHER]. 
292 Request for Consultations by the United States, India –Export Related Measures, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS541/1 (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=250170,247026,245291,244047,244048,243854&C
urrentCatalogueIdIndex=5&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord
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March 2018, the United States challenged a host of Indian export programs 
at the WTO.
293
 The complained-of measures are export promotion 
programs, special economic zones,294 and policies allowing exporters to 
import duty-free.295 Although India had special dispensation at the WTO 
level for the programs through 2015, the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) complained that India had continued and expanded its export 
subsidies since then, saying the “apparent export subsidies provide financial 
benefits to Indian exporters that allow them to sell their goods more cheaply 
to the detriment of American workers and manufacturers.”296 USTR also 
explained, “India provides exemptions from certain duties, taxes, and fees . 
. . and benefits numerous Indian exporters, including producers of steel . . 
. .”297 The legal basis for the Unites States’ complaint was the SCM 
Agreement Article 3.1(a).
298
 
2. Minnesota’s EITE Subsidy Under the WTO Regime 
The EITE statute appears to be a straightforward violation of the above 
standards. It is either a violation of SCM Agreement Article 3.1(a) or (b) 
because: under Article 3.1(a), it is offered to increase production at trade-
exposed (i.e., capable of exporting and competing against imported 
commodities) industries, to displace imports and promote export; or, under 
 
=True&HasSpanishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/3JN9-BAAP] [hereinafter Request for 
Consultations by the United States – India]. 
293 Press Release, Off. U.S. Trade Representative, United States Launches WTO Challenge 
to Indian Export Subsidy Programs (Mar. 14, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/march/united-states-launches-wto-challenge 
[https://perma.cc/H48A-X9PN]. 
294 “Many developing countries operate geographically delineated economic areas . . . . They 
experiment in these special economic zones (SEZs) with infrastructure, regulatory, and fiscal 
policies that are different from those implemented in the rest of the domestic economy with 
the aim of attracting foreign investment, creating employment opportunities, and boosting 
exports.” STEPHEN CRESKOFF & PETER WALKENHORST, THE WORLD BANK, ACHIEVING 
WTO COMPLIANCE FOR SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (Apr. 
2009), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/155141468337481040/Achieving-
WTO-compliance-for-special-economic-zones-in-developing-countries 
[https://perma.cc/V59M-3V8Z]. 
295 Panels Established to Rule on Indian Export Measures, US Duties, WTO (May 28, 
2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_28may18_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U7N4-LVQL]. 
296 Off. U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 293. 
297 Id. 
298 Request for Consultations by the United States – India, supra note 292. 
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Article 3.1(b), it subsidizes using domestic content299 from Minnesota mines 
and forests.300  
Under SCM Agreement Article 3.1(a), a main issue is whether the 
EITE statute, designed to protect “trade-exposed” industries, explicitly 
subsidizes exports by subsidizing electricity to boost production. Some 
recipients of the EITE rate would likely argue that their exports are 
negligible or that they used the money garnered to enrich their shareholders 
and executives, not to increase exports. Iron and steel companies, however, 
likely would have a hard time making that case. This is especially true of 
U.S. Steel, which testified it might be able to export steel because of the 
EITE subsidy.301 It also has tied the EITE subsidy to the reopening of the 
Keetac mine and iron processing facility. In March 2017, U.S. Steel’s 
general manager of mining asserted that, “Quite frankly, measures such as 
the September 2016 Commission approval of the EITE Customer Rider 
were crucial ingredients in our ability to realize the startup of Keetac this 
month.”302 Minnesota Power argued that Keetac’s operation increased 
statewide taconite production.303 The PUC acknowledged and accepted 
that these parties asserted that the EITE rate contributed to the opening of 
Keetac.304 This is in turn consistent with the Commission’s finding that the 
EITE rate would benefit the utility by assuring increased production by 
 
299 Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Measures Concerning Wind 
Power Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS419/1 (Jan. 6, 2011), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=101977&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHa
sh=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True 
[https://perma.cc/2K6C-CB3S]. 
300 Whether 3(b) would apply to the EITE statute as it applies to industries such as oil and 
natural gas is a complicated question regarding whether the transport of Canadian oil and gas 
moots the argument, or if the benefit that other pipelines provide to North Dakota 
production suffices to show the domestic content subsidy. As this would require a long 
digression into the world of oil markets and significant conjecture, it is probably best left for 
another day. 
301 In the Matter of Revised Petition by Minnesota Power for a Competitive Rate for Energy-
Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) and an EITE Cost Recovery Rider, Order Denying 
Reconsideration at 6–7, E-015/M-16-564 (Minn. P.U.C. Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Minn. 
P.U.C. Order Denying Reconsideration for Minnesota Power Revised Petition]. 
302 Memorandum from Lawrence W. Sutherland to Daniel Wolf (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPo
up&documentId=%7B18F84871-F067-4C0B-801B-
2D0E3E057592%7D&documentTitle=20173-129799-01 [https://perma.cc/Q882-YNNV]. 
303 JENNIFER J. PETERSON, MINNESOTA POWER COMPLIANCE FILING 8 (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searchDocuments.do?method=showPo
up&documentId=%7B30EC5661-0000-CA11-9A68-
5BE168F51C90%7D&documentTitle=20182-139690-01 [https://perma.cc/QUL7-Y8KX] 
(“Taconite production partially rebounded after the fall 2016 restart of United Taconite and 
the winter 2017 restart of Keetac.”). 
304 Minn. P.U.C. Order Denying Reconsideration for Minnesota Power Revised Petition 
MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, supra note 301.  
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customers.305 In January 2019, the shipments of taconite from 2018 were 
estimated to be 25% larger than the average of the five previous years, 
indicating a banner year for taconite shipping and increases in 
production.306 While it is not clear that American iron and steel is yet being 
exported in larger amounts, the above-discussed U.S. Commerce 
Department trade reports show that domestic production is growing and 
displacing imported product in the domestic market.307  
Similarly, under SCM Agreement Article 3.1(b), the EITE rate 
appears to violate the prohibition on domestic-content subsidies. This is 
mainly because the few customers who benefit from the EITE rate produce 
commodity products from domestic raw materials. A Minnesota taconite 
processing facility is often built at the mine, and it is not economical to bring 
ore from faraway places to have it processed in remote northern Minnesota. 
The same is true of the paper mills benefitting from the rate—while their raw 
material is spread over a larger and changing area of the state than the 
mines’, it is unlikely that these companies would continue to be profitable 
overall if they sourced timber inputs from distant states and countries. Even 
if the paper milling or pipeline industry were able to show that their business 
was sufficiently dependent on Canadian inputs to rebut a subsidy for 
domestic content theory, Minnesota mines cannot argue that they use 
anything but the ore they mine.308 This would be true of proposed mining 
projects that would also fall under the EITE rate.309  
The fact that the EITE subsidy comes from a private party—here an 
electric utility company—instead of directly from the government, should be 
immaterial to whether it violates WTO obligations. Like Chinese state-
owned banks giving solar companies a glut of credit to spur production,310 
Minnesota Power’s EITE subsidy for trade-exposed businesses was directed 
and approved by the Legislature and Commission, making the company’s 
 
305 Id.  
306 Press Release, Iron Mining Ass’n of Minn., Outlook Good for 2018 Minnesota Iron 
Shipments, (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.taconite.org/news/latest/?273 
[https://perma.cc/Z9LQ-6CUY]. 
307 See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 10. 
308 It is not obvious whether the EITE rate could provide sufficient benefits to the state or 
Minnesota utilities if was nondiscriminatory towards inputs from other states and countries.  
309 Even the next generation of proposed mines (those meant to mine copper and nickel 
from sulfide-bearing rock) are envisioned to have processing plants onsite. See generally 
DAVID DREISINGER ET AL., METALLURGICAL PROCESSING OF POLYMET MINING’S 
NORTHMET DEPOSIT FOR RECOVERY OF CU-NI-CO-ZN-PD-PT-AU 1 (2006), 
https://www.sgs.com/-/media/global/documents/technical-documents/sgs-technical-
papers/sgs-min-tp2006-06-recovery-of-cu-ni-co-zn-pd-pt-au-at-northmet-deposit.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MJX3-5WXA]. These mines, though not yet in existence, would certainly 
be able to benefit from the EITE rate—legislators who introduced the EITE statute explicitly 
mentioned these facilities in an earlier version of the bill, and the catch-all provision in the 
enacted statute seemingly covers them. See S.F. 1312, 89th Leg. (Minn. 2015). 
310 Bradsher & Cardwell, supra note 288. 
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foregoing of income from large customers for electrical costs the same as a 
state subsidy.  
3. WTO “Precedent” of India Solar Cells and Made in Minnesota 
In light of U.S. trade actions against other countries’ steel 
overproduction and dumping, the U.S.’ aggressive stance may be vulnerable 
to counterattacks because of Minnesota’s EITE subsidy of trade-exposed 
industries. When looking at the big picture, the question naturally arises: 
Does it really matter if the only U.S. state where iron is mined and processed 
is subsidizing production by lowering energy costs? Can this sort of state-
level, Minnesota-specific policy even rise to the level of a WTO dispute?  
If the EITE statute came before the WTO it would not be the first 
time that one of Minnesota’s state supports for industry was presented as a 
prohibited subsidy violation in an ongoing trade dispute. One such policy 
came up in an ongoing case between the U.S. and India, where Minnesota’s 
support of locally-made solar panels was offered as a defense to a trade 
action brought by the U.S. against India’s local-content supports.311 These 
cases usually take years to resolve.312 In early 2013, the United States 
requested consultation with India regarding its Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Solar Mission (NSM) for solar cells and solar modules.
313
 Unfortunately for 
the NSM, its explicit goal of “attract[ing] industry and project developers to 
invest in research, domestic manufacturing and development of solar power 
generation and thus create the critical mass for a domestic solar industry”314 
was seen as discriminating against foreign solar manufacturers. 
Like many other green programs to increase the adoption of renewable 
energy, the NSM required a certain amount of new solar to be installed by 
certain dates.
315
 The main trade-distorting feature of the Indian NSM was 
 
311 Hughlett, supra note 286. 
312 For example, a case between the U.S. and Mexico over dolphin-safe tuna took over a 
decade to resolve. DS381: United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm [https://perma.cc/692E-
RT9L]. 
313 Request for Consultations by the United States, India – Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/1 (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8UA3-ADUT] [hereinafter Request for Consultations]. India’s program, 
meant to promote the adoption of technology and develop an industry supporting domestic 
clean energy production, was a win-win-win for domestic industry, Indians without power, 
and the fight against climate change. See MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL SOLAR MISSION: TOWARDS BUILDING SOLAR INDIA 1-2 
(2009) https://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/mission_document_JNNSM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6SEL-2PQA] [hereinafter Jawaharlal]. 
314 Request for Consultations, supra note 313. 
315 Id. at 8. 
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the domestic content requirements imposed under the regime.
316
 Ultimately, 
when the NSM was implemented, the government’s policy required the 
development of solar power and then required the solar power developers 
installing solar cells and modules of certain types to use products made in 
India.
317
 As discussed above, these provisions likely run afoul of the SCM 
Agreement as domestic-content requirements and potentially prohibited 
subsidies of exports. The U.S. complained that the NSM’s domestic content 
requirement was “inconsistent with WTO non-discrimination 
obligations.”318 The WTO determined that the NSM violated its trade 
agreements regarding the treatment of foreign producers and treating similar 
goods from other jurisdictions the same under favorable policies.319  
Notably, in the dispute India pointed out that Minnesota and seven 
other states also had domestic-content requirements that supported their 
own solar panel manufacturing industries.320 It specifically faulted the 
“Made In Minnesota” program that subsidized purchases of panels that 
 
316 As the government explained at the outset: 
Transforming India into a solar energy hub would include a leadership role in 
low-cost, high quality solar manufacturing, including balance of system 
components. Proactive implementation of Special Incentive Package (SIPs) 
policy, to promote PV manufacturing plants, including domestic manufacture 
of silicon material, would be necessary . . . . It should be ensured that transfer 
of technology is built into Government and private procurement from foreign 
sources.  
Jawaharlal, supra note 313, at 5. Transfer of technology from foreign companies is a major 
flashpoint in the U.S.-China trade war as well. Karishma Vaswani, Trade War: Three Things 
the US and China Will Never Agree on, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46819099 [https://perma.cc/4CWQ-GYCC]. After 
noting that the Indian capacity to make solar cells is still very low, the NSM explicitly made 
the case for preferential treatment for local production to “take a global leadership role in 
solar manufacturing . . . including setting up of dedicated manufacturing capabilities for poly 
silicon material to annually make about 2 GW capacity of solar cells.” Jawaharlal, supra note 
313, at 9; Vaswani, supra note 316. After noting that Indian solar cell construction capacity 
remains low, the NSM explicitly made the case for preferential treatment for local production 
in order to “take a global leadership role in solar manufacturing . . . including setting up of 
dedicated manufacturing capabilities for poly silicon material to annually make about 2 GW 
capacity of solar cells.” Jawaharlal, supra note 313, at 9. 
317 Request for the Establishment of a Panel, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar 
Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/20 (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=241819,241280,241135,241035,237038,233141,23
2582,232015,231936,231246&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishR
ecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/7YL2-
CRYY] [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the United States]. 
318 Id. 
319 Hughlett, supra note 286. 
320 Id. 
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were assembled in Minnesota.321 This program “invit[ed] retaliation from 
India” in the form of its own domestic content requirement.322 Similar to 
the EITE subsidy, the “Made In Minnesota” program also required 
producers to be certified by the state in order to benefit from the program, 
and only five producers were certified.323 Though the program was funded 
at merely $15 million annually,324 it was nevertheless relevant to the overall 
dispute and provided India with a viable defense for its larger program.  
India and the United States are still contesting this solar industry 
case.325 While the United States seems to have won the overall dispute at 
the WTO level,326 the existence of the now-repealed “Made In Minnesota” 
program weakened the position of the United States because it was the pot 
calling the kettle black.327  
More generally, trade issues have been a major sore point between the 
Trump administration and India’s current leadership.328 With these 
 
321 Id.  
322 Id. (quoting Ben Lilliston).  
323 Id.  
324 Id.  
325 The dispute between the United States and India has continued despite the WTO’s legal 
resolution and the imposition of tariffs to offset the DSM. In 2018, India asked for a new 
WTO dispute settlement panel to resolve the continuing dispute while the United States 
requested authorization to retaliate based on India’s failure to comply. Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by India, supra note 317. 
326 The U.S.’s stronger economy allows it to negotiate outside the WTO and realize optimal 
outcomes even when its position does not comply with the letter of a trade law. James Kanter 
& Gary Rivlin, In Trade Ruling, Antigua Wins a Right to Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/business/worldbusiness/22gambling.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZPG3-LD65]. But see DS285: United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO (Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G9TW-GMFT] (noting that despite Antigua’s victory and the imposition 
of significant penalties, “the United States was not in compliance with the ruling of the panel.” 
Ultimately, “Antigua requested the DSB suspend concessions and obligations to the United 
States with respect to intellectual property rights,” settling the dispute years after their outright 
win before the WTO). 
327 Much like India’s complaint about “Made In Minnesota,” China and the EU have 
initiated WTO proceedings against the U.S. for state and local incentives that favor buying 
locally-sourced solar hardware. Request to Join Consultations by the European Union, 
United States – Certain Measures Related to Renewable Energy, WTO Doc. WT/DS563/3 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/DS563_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y6JM-ZD4B]; China Initiates Dispute Complaints Against US Solar Cell 
Duties, Renewable Energy Measures, WTO (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ds562_563rfc_16aug18_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y9LM-LGK8]. This conflict presently remains in the pre-trial stage of 
“consultation” but could break into a full-fledged dispute. 
328 Are Trade Issues Spoiling the Trump-Modi Bromance?, BBC NEWS (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-44639927 [https://perma.cc/798C-RKNT]. Like 
China and the EU, India retaliated against tariffs on aluminum and steel by raising tariffs on 
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widening divides between the U.S. and its historic partners, the U.S. position 
could again be weakened if states like Minnesota implement export 
subsidies or domestic content subsidies that could be exploited in disputes 
with India, Canada and Mexico, the EU, or even China—a trade war that 
shows no sign of slowing.329 The U.S. has lost disputes of this sort with 
China in the past.330 Similarly, it could come up in a dispute brought by the 
U.S.—the two countries are currently in consultations regarding China’s 
possible violation of the SCM Agreement regarding production of primary 
aluminum.331 Opportunities for the EITE statute to complicate larger 
disputes are replete. 
VI. EITE STUNTING MINNESOTA IRON INNOVATION 
As discussed above, Minnesota has a long history of resource 
extraction industries, and chief among them is the iron industry. Those who 
faithfully support any and every kind of Minnesotan mining often say we 
have the best facilities overseen by the best regulators implementing the best 
 
U.S. goods such as walnuts, almonds, and shrimp. Id. The trade tensions recently escalated 
again, as the U.S. removed India from its preferential trading status reserved for developing 
countries. Trump Targets India and Turkey in Trade Crackdown, BBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47450224 [https://perma.cc/35GQ-X7CF]. 
329 China, joined by twenty-nine other WTO members, has formally challenged the U.S. 
global steel and aluminum tariffs. Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of 
China, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS544/9 (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/DS544_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9F9D-KARA]. It is possible that in an active and complex dispute like this, 
policies like “Made In Minnesota” and the EITE statute will be raised and vetted to 
determine whether the U.S. has clean hands regarding free trade. 
330 While the current dispute over the U.S.’s most recent tariffs is still in its very early stages, 
the last time the U.S. attempted to put up large-scale trade safeguards against foreign steel, 
China and a group of WTO members beat the U.S. Panel Report, United States—Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS248/20 
(Dec. 6, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/DS252_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/73DU-3K8N]. China has beaten the U.S. in interpreting countervailing 
duty requirements at the WTO’s highest tribunal. Appellate Body Report, United States—
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/29 
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds437_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R4E2-Q66A]. That said, China also has lost regarding its restrictions on 
exports of rare earth metals. Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/14 (Sept. 
2, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/DS431_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C4X7-J7AL]. These complex, slow-moving, disputes add uncertainty to 
international trade, and it seems that even small programs affecting only parts of the puzzle 
can affect the validity of tariffs and countervailing duties, affecting billions of dollars in trade. 
331 China—Subsidies to Producers of Primary Aluminium, WTO Summary DS519 (Feb. 13, 
2017), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/DS519_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JHY8-DYBW]. 
60
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss1/8
298 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
laws in the world332—but the history of mining in Minnesota falls short of 
this rosy gloss. Understanding the history of iron in Minnesota and beyond 
helps to explain the industry’s long relationship with powerbrokers. 
A. Minnesota’s Iron History 
Iron smelting began in the American colonies when the British Isles 
started running out of trees due to overconsumption in the Industrial 
Revolution.
333
 This problem led to the innovation of burning coal instead of 
wood in the production of iron and steel—the dawn of rapid human-induced 
climate change.
334
 In 1889, U.S. industrialist Andrew Carnegie consolidated 
his business holdings into the Carnegie Steel Company, which made half as 
much steel as all of England at the time.
335
 His Homestead Steel Works 
facility was based in Pittsburgh at a time when the city’s industries produced 
enough pollution to block out the sun.
336
  
At that time, large amounts of iron ore were discovered in Minnesota. 
Businesspeople from Duluth discovered the first deposits of what they 
dubbed “Mountain Iron” in what is now called the Iron Range.337 Then, in 
the late 1890s, John D. Rockefeller took ownership of these large mineral 
deposits.
338
  
In 1901, Carnegie sold his steel company to a businessman who 
merged it with additional steel mills to form the U.S. Steel Corporation.
339
 
“The new United States Steel Corporation was the largest company in the 
world, manufacturing two-thirds of the nation’s steel.”340 As the local 
 
332 This argument is popular among politicians seeking statewide office and is often used to 
justify new forms of mining in Minnesota, though it is frequently associated with the existing 
mining industry. See, e.g., Tom Olsen, Smith, Housley on Mining, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. 
(Oct. 27, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/government-and-
politics/4520395-smith-housley-mining-environment [https://perma.cc/U6W6-GF4T] 
(quoting a political candidate asserting: “With a strong and workable regulatory process in 
place, Minnesota has some of the strictest environmental standards in the world—which 
mining companies are required to meet or exceed during the environmental review and 
permitting process.”). 
333 Jonathan Schifman, The Entire History of Steel, POPULAR MECHANICS (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/infrastructure/a20722505/history-of-steel/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3B7-2JCF]. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
337 GRANT J. MERRITT, IRON AND WATER: MY LIFE PROTECTING MINNESOTA’S 
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2018).  
338 Id. at 7–8. 
339 Schifman, supra note 333. 
340 Id. 
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Virginia, Minnesota, newspaper explains: “U.S. Steel has been around 
almost as long as the Range has.”341 
Following WWII, the U.S. boasted over half of the world’s steel 
production.
342
 Other countries’ technological advances and investment in 
innovations, however, left the U.S. steelmakers behind the curve.
343
 Starting 
in the 1950s, European and Asian steel became cheaper than U.S. products 
due to lower labor costs and improved production methods—the “basic 
oxygen process.”344 Instead of keeping up with these competitors, the U.S. 
industry continued to use an outdated, inefficient technology for several 
more decades.
345
 This failure to adapt eventually caught up with them: 
In 1970, U.S. Steel’s run as the world’s largest steel company 
ended after seven decades, supplanted by Japan’s Nippon Steel. 
China became the world’s top steelmaker in the 1990s, and 
Bethlehem Steel closed its plant in Bethlehem in 1995. It wasn’t 
until the late 20th century that most American steel mills finally 
adopted the basic oxygen process. As of 2016, the United States 
ranked fourth in steel production according to the World Steel 
Association.
346
 
The basic oxygen process is still in use in the United States today, using 
coal to make steel and emitting four times the emissions of more recent and 
efficient “mini mills” that use electric furnaces and recycle scrap steel.347 It 
 
341 Charles Ramsay, U.S. Steel/Minntac: Company’s Footprint on Range Big, and Passes the 
Test of Time, MESABI DAILY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://www.virginiamn.com/news/business/u-s-steel-minntac-company-s-footprint-on-range-
big/article_dbaa999e-878f-11e2-a733-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/6NX2-MVYA] 
(emphasis added). 
342 Schifman, supra note 333. 
343 See id. (“But overseas, a dire need to rebuild, and the introduction of new steelmaking 
technology, was about to help foreign steel companies flourish . . . . While nations in Europe 
and Asia immediately adopted the basic oxygen process, American mills, still at the top of 
the industry, soldiered on using the Siemens-Martin process in confident contentment—
unwittingly opening the door for foreign competition.”). 
344 Id.  
345 Id.; Stephen Mihm, How the U.S. Squandered its Steel Superiority, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 
5, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-03-05/steel-history-
shows-how-america-lost-ground-to-europe [https://perma.cc/5W99-59GF] (“The cost of 
building steel mills using the basic-oxygen furnaces was 40 to 50 percent lower than 
conventional open-hearth factories; operating costs were 25 percent lower, though some 
studies suggested even greater cost savings . . . . One factory that made the shift [to the new 
process] could produce 40 tons of steel per hour using the open-hearth process, but after 
installing basic-oxygen equipment, it managed to quadruple that figure.”). 
346 Schifman, supra note 333. 
347 Id.; see TURNER, supra note 28. Nonetheless, as of the early 2000s, two-thirds of global 
steel production was generated from the basic-oxygen process, while 24 percent came from 
mini mills. TURNER, supra note 28. (citing CLINTON WATSON, ET AL., OECD, CAN 
TRANSNATIONAL SECTORAL AGREEMENTS HELP REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS? 
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seems that U.S. industry is again behind its innovative competitors, 
contributing to the technological deficit that has continued to lower the 
country’s standing in global steel production.348  
B. Minnesota Iron’s Future 
Over the years Minnesota’s industry has eagerly guarded its existing 
rights to pollute rather than adopting and implementing efficiency or 
pollution-control upgrades. For example, even though the global steel 
industry began making itself more efficient by building “giant integrated 
plants for the continuous casting of steel” in the 1960s,349 Minnesota has yet 
to have one such facility and is still operating on the old model where it 
ships low-value iron out of state instead.  
Three-fourths of the emissions from steelmaking come from the iron-
making stage during the basic-oxygen process.
350
 These emissions could be 
cut in half if plants were upgraded to a “direct reduced iron” system that 
used natural gas instead of coal,
351
 an idea that has been suggested and tested 
in Minnesota.
352
  
Benefitting from the strong tailwinds of current national trade policies, 
including high tariffs on imported steel of all types, the industry in 
Minnesota is seemingly ignoring the opportunity to seriously invest in 
 
(June 2, 2005)). By 2012, 57 percent of U.S. steel production came from mini mills, TURNER, 
supra note 28, meaning the national industry was generally more efficient than its most-
polluting facilities in the upper Midwest.  
348 While U.S. industry doubles down on old methods, China—whose steel industry had 
been outmoded much like in the U.S.—imposed limits on steel production in 2017, 
reportedly, to emit less GHGs. Schifman, supra note 333. China’s steel industry has also 
been inefficient relative to Europe, Japan, and South Korea, due to its small inefficient plants, 
reliance on the basic-oxygen processes, and production overcapacity. See TURNER, supra 
note 28, at 2. 
349 New Technologies Could Slash the Cost of Steel Production, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/03/09/new-technologies-could-slash-the-
cost-of-steel-production [https://perma.cc/BM4L-YFXX] [hereinafter THE ECONOMIST: 
New Technologies]. 
350 See TURNER, supra note 28. 
351 Id. 
352 See Kraker, supra note 76. By contrast, the EU is funding an “Ultra Low CO2 Steelmaking 
(ULCOS) initiative,” which is testing new technologies and will share innovations to reduce 
emissions among ULCOS member-companies. See TURNER, supra note 28, at 2. Two 
technologies are being tested that could eliminate steps in the steelmaking process and cut 
energy consumption by 80 percent. THE ECONOMIST: New Technologies, supra note 349. 
These technologies may ultimately cut transportation costs by allowing production to be 
located closer to manufacturers’ customers. THE ECONOMIST: New Technologies, supra 
note 349 (noting that an expert on one of the new technologies “thinks it is not inconceivable 
for such a plant to be integrated within a car factory”).  
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modernizing.
353
 Instead of investing in updated technology, U.S. Steel is 
expending legal resources fighting U.S. manufacturers’ requests to be 
exempt from the Trump administration’s tariffs on imported steel.354 At the 
same time, U.S. Steel’s spokesperson described “expansion plans . . . to 
meet US demand” as restarting old, idled furnaces without investing in any 
new facilities or technology.
355
 Indeed, when the President claimed his steel 
tariffs had induced U.S. Steel to build new mills, he was proven wrong.
356
 
Minnesota policymakers have an opportunity to change course and 
implement policies that would strengthen the economy while also reducing 
GHG emissions and supporting a key heavy industry.357 If conditions 
changed and the EITE-eligible entities were incentivized to modernize 
(something akin to the CIP statute without its exception), rapid advances 
seem possible—especially with a suite of available technologies that have yet 
to be used anywhere in Minnesota’s aging facilities.358  
“The iron and steel industry is the largest energy consuming 
manufacturing sector and the second-largest industrial consumer of 
energy[.]”359 It follows that Minnesota’s artificially low EITE-rate-supported 
energy prices send a signal to this industry to stay the course while high 
 
353 This appears consistent with the industry’s history over the past few decades. As a steel 
executive (one whose fortune was tied to efficient mini mills rather than mining and basic-
oxygen furnaces) said in 1986: “As soon as prices began to rise so that the steel companies 
began to be profitable, they stopped modernizing,” and only stiff competition causes them 
to upgrade their facilities. Mihm, supra note 345. 
354 Natalie Sherman, The Manufacturers Fighting Trump’s Tariffs, BBC News (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45594143 [https://perma.cc/A33K-EXND]. 
355 Id.; see also Tobias, supra note 227 (noting that U.S. Steel’s investments at the time 
“include[d] plans . . . to restart two blast furnaces that will create 800 new jobs at an integrated 
steel-making plant in Granite City”). 
356 See Tobias, supra note 227. 
357 Even under current trade protection by the U.S. and subsidization by the state, the 
industry appears to be at the mercy of production decisions made in other countries with 
lower production costs. See Kelly Busche, Cleveland Cliffs Reports Revenue in Third 
Quarter,  DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/business/energy-and-mining/4735632-Cleveland-Cliffs-
reports-revenue-in-third-quarter [https://perma.cc/QKA8-JTRD] (“China and its surrogates 
overproduced steel, and then moved the excess steel to the European market.”); see also 
Layoffs Announced at two U.S. Steel Mines on Iron Range, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS, Nov. 
9, 2019, https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/11/09/layoffs-announced-at-two-us-steel-
mines-on-iron-range [https://perma.cc/2T52-FA8M]. 
358 Ironically, China is instrumental in bailing out and modernizing British Steel after that 
company went into liquidation. Dominic O’Connell, Jingye to Invest £1bn and Save 
'Thousands of British Steel Jobs', BBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2019) 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50369413 [https://perma.cc/R7Y9-4YC7] (“Group 
chairman Li Ganpo said it would spend £1.2bn over the next decade in upgrading plant and 
machinery, ‘improving the company’s environmental performance . . . and boosting energy 
efficiency to place the operations on a more competitive and sustainable footing’.”). 
359 See TURNER supra note 28 (footnote omitted). 
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energy prices and other market-based signals (or even direct regulation 
mandating minimum standards as a cost of staying in business) could instead 
foster a rapid shift toward efficiency among the biggest players and emitters 
in the state. If Minnesota is “still in” for Paris-Agreement-like environmental 
protection, something should be attempted to prove it. 360  If world leaders 
do not act to reduce GHG emissions soon and in coordination, human-
caused warming might soon be out of control for good.361 Internationally, 
the G20 nations have been asked to totally phase out “market distorting 
fossil fuel production subsidies.”362 Minnesota can do its part as regards its 
own EITE subsidy. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
In response to the U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs, other countries 
have acted. Along with its countervailing duties and formal WTO reaction, 
the President of the EU Commission made a surprisingly frank statement 
about how tit-for-tat trade remedies work in the real world: 
 
360 Within this discussion, it is also useful to remember that the situation with the U.S. trade 
war(s) and the scientific understanding behind climate change are both actively evolving. 
Currently, U.S. trade policy vacillates from more convivial to less functional, depending on 
the week and the countries it is dealing with. US and Canada Reach New Trade Deal to 
Replace Nafta, BBC News (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45702609 
[https://perma.cc/4XPW-ASLJ]; China Accuses U.S. of Trade Bullying as New Tariffs 
Imposed, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45622075 
[https://perma.cc/K7EM-8A67]. At the same time, the news on climate change is becoming 
more dire and immediate. Matt McGrath, IPCC: Climate Scientists Consider “Life 
Changing” Report, BBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-45653099 [https://perma.cc/XJ23-A48S]. 
361 VALÉRIE MASSON-DELMOTTE ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT—GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5℃ 1 (2018), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ [https://perma.cc/EH87-R546]. Recent studies also show 
that previous assumptions about the speed of warming and ability of environments to absorb 
the damage could have been overly optimistic. Matt McGrath, Climate Change: Concerns 
Over Report on Ocean Heating, BBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-46046067 [https://perma.cc/K7ZA-
QUVX]. Concurrently, the international legal community is recognizing that there should be 
a solution to the suite of problems caused by contemporary kinds of pollution. The “human 
right to a healthy environment” includes a right to live with healthy and clean air. Michelle 
Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement made to UNHCR, “No 
Such Thing as an Unimportant Child”—Bachelet on Harm to Children by Air Pollution 
(Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23810&LangID
=E [https://perma.cc/LD8F-ZDYU]. 
362 Karl Mathiesen, Vulnerable Nations Call on G20 to End Fossil Fuel Subsidies By 2020, 
CLIMATE DIPLOMACY (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/news/vulnerable-
nations-call-g20-end-fossil-fuel-subsidies-2020 [https://perma.cc/QGF6-Y8ZL] (“The CVF 
meeting, which was chaired by Ethiopia, said subsidies for fossil fuels could only be justified 
when they provided real benefits to the poor.”). 
65
Kingston: Strictly Leakage: How Minnesota Export Subsidies Pay for Climate
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
   
2019] STRICTLY LEAKAGE  303 
So now we will also impose import tariffs. This is basically a 
stupid process, the fact that we have to do this. But we have to do 
it. We will now impose tariffs on motorcycles, Harley Davidson, 
on blue jeans, Levis, on Bourbon. We can also do stupid. We 
also have to be this stupid.
363
 
The system is designed so that rational nations ordinarily would not be 
motivated to do stupid things.364 Nevertheless, U.S. sanctions that set off the 
EU’s admittedly stupid reaction remain in place.365 
Trade policy does not have to be this way. This year the EU and Japan 
entered into a trade deal of their own, the first ever to explicitly refer to the 
Paris Agreement to reduce GHG emissions.
366
 Many in favor of multilateral 
trade regimes would say trade law is meant to foster relationships that lead 
to fewer wars, more wealth, and a world order where nations can all do 
better when they all do better.367 International trade has often not risen to 
these aspirations, but it purports to be part of the eventual solution to global 
issues such as poverty and war. It has yet to be seen if trade will help, or just 
harm, attempts to regulate GHG emissions worldwide.368 
In that context, Minnesota is not securing a better world for all. At the 
global climate change policy level, Minnesota’s EITE statute is a 
 
363 Euronews, Juncker Responds to Trump’s Trade Tariffs: “We Can Also Do Stupid”, 
EURONEWS, (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.euronews.com/2018/03/03/juncker-responds-to-
trump-s-trade-tariffs-we-can-also-do-stupid- [https://perma.cc/5TGP-KS6Z] (quote from 
European Commission Chief Jean-Claude Juncker on Mar. 2, 2018 in Hamburg). 
364 Despite some bluster and legal arguments, even the most dramatic disputes can end with 
settlements that change the status quo only minimally. For example, after beating the U.S. 
on online gambling at the WTO the governments of Antigua and Bermuda settled and 
requested that the WTO remove the concessions it had authorized against the U.S. instead 
of reaping $21 million a year in IP-violative countermeasures. See Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-
United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. OF INT’L COM. & ECON. (July 2009), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/online_gambling_dispute.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5N3-UJZ8]; WTO, supra note 331. 
365 US Ends Diplomatic Protocol Tiff With EU, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47439302 [https://perma.cc/WA3Z-T8TN]. 
366 Press Release, European Commission, EU-Japan Trade Agreement on Track to Enter 
into Force in February 2019 (Dec. 12, 2018), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1954 [https://perma.cc/JC5R-BXP3]. 
367 See generally Gary Cunningham, We All Do Better When We All Do Better, STAR 
TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.startribune.com/we-all-do-better-when-we-all-do-
better/103588254/ [https://perma.cc/9A94-YBKJ] (“The title of this article is a phrase coined 
by the late, great senator from Minnesota, Paul Wellstone.”). 
368 The WTO claims to favor protecting the environment and public health, but that same 
statement indicates it opposes protections that do not conform with its other values. What 
We Stand For, supra note 265. Meanwhile, environmental organizations in the international 
sphere view the WTO as a threat to overall environmental protection. See, e.g., Why Is the 
WTO a Problem?, GREENPEACE, https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-
international/en/campaigns/trade-and-the-environment/why-is-the-wto-a-problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/7DWM-NMAB]. 
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subsidization of leakage, a policy that draws additional pollution to the state 
by keeping out-of-date facilities operating at maximum output instead of 
allowing them to idle or fail under market forces (a natural result of a 
prolonged lack of investment in efficient new technology). At the 
multilateral or bilateral trade level, Minnesota’s EITE statute is likely a 
“thumb on the scale” that violates the U.S.’s commitments to open and fair 
trade in goods, especially commodities that are being subsidized so they can 
be dumped into global markets. At the state level, Minnesota’s EITE statute 
is the subsidization of warmer winters, public health risks from climate 
change impacts, and polluted water. It is paid for by tens of thousands of 
rural Minnesotans, many of whom are low income, rely on local natural 
resources for survival, and have no choice in where to obtain electricity. At 
the moral level, Minnesota’s EITE statute avoids normal ratemaking 
standards and therefore (unlike other rates the Commission oversees) can 
be discriminatory, unreasonable, and without regard for state values 
encouraging renewable energy or avoiding the needless waste of energy 
resources. With a view to history, Minnesota’s EITE statute subsidizes 
industries that provide less and less employment to citizens of the state, 
while taking the profits of their labor and the natural resources elsewhere.  
In the 2017 legislative session, the Minnesota Legislature phased out 
the “Made In Minnesota” subsidy program that supported the state’s 
fledgling solar energy program,369 at the same time as two Minnesota utilities 
started to give away millions of dollars in EITE subsidies to Minnesota’s 
declining heavy industries. This is the balance that Minnesota has set for 
now—clean energy must succeed with less protection from market forces, 
but the industries that do the most harm to our water and climate have 
assurances of ongoing support. The state’s government has picked winners 
and losers, and the winners are largely companies and stockholders based 
outside of the state. What employment benefits arise from this subsidy are 
continually undercut by advances in mechanization and the ability of these 
businesses to use fewer and fewer workers to produce more and more 
exports.370 A state that is “still in” the global effort to control GHG pollution 
would do well to look into policies like EITE, and enact policies that 
promote innovation over a destructive status quo.  
 
369 Made in Minnesota Solar Incentive Program, MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
https://mn.gov/commerce/industries/energy/solar/mim/ [https://perma.cc/CLA9-DSF7]. 
370 This is not an issue affecting the state’s solar installation industry, which grows along with 
technological innovation. Solar Industry, MINN. DEP’T OF COM., 
https://mn.gov/commerce/industries/energy/solar/ [https://perma.cc/WPV5-B8EY] (“Solar 
jobs more than doubled in the last four years in Minnesota, from 1,995 in 2015 to 4,602 in 
2018. Minnesota solar jobs increased 8% in 2018, even as solar jobs nationwide declined 
3.2%.”).  
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